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As technological advancements have made it possible to target online media consumers 
personally on an unprecedented scale, as well as to boost the prevalence of particular news 
stories and viewpoints on online platforms, political interference has taken on new forms. 
While online platforms can provide possibilities for democratic participation, they have also 
caused various concerns, ranging from privacy issues to ‘echo chambers’ and ‘fake news’, and 
the impact that these issues could have on democratic processes. Particularly since reports 
came out of Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential elections as well as the UK’s Brexit 
referendum, debates about disinformation have been prevalent in public discussions around 
the world.  
For EU leaders, the problem of disinformation rose to the political agenda already in 2013-
2014, when reports emerged about cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns targeted at 
Ukraine during Euromaidan and later the war in Crimea, raising alert on hybrid threats around 
Europe. One notable characteristic about the war in Crimea was the use of attacks in the 
information sphere, which played a decisive role in the outcome of events. Many observers 
interpreted the success and efficiency of the information and psychological operations used in 
the war in Crimea as a sign that information attacks would become an increasingly common 
form of warfare. 
At the same time, concerns have been raised about a shift towards a “post-truth” politics, in 
which the importance of facts and rationality is declining and political contests are increasingly 
won by appeals to emotions rather than reasoned arguments. The European Parliamentary 
Research Service (EPRS), for example, has stated that in the “post-truth era”, not only is 
disinformation being proliferated but it is more easily believed (EPRS 2018). This, in turn, could 
be damaging for the legitimacy of democratic outcomes, if the issues that guide voting behavior 
can now be made up and ‘planted’ into public discussions by external and actors. The post-
truth era and the polarization of political debates is seen to create fertile ground for 
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information attacks that seek to destabilize target societies by exacerbating divisions and 
distrust.  
According to the EU, Russian disinformation campaigns are currently targeting European 
societies. A European Parliament (EP) report on strategic communication and anti-EU 
propaganda in 2016 stated that disinformation campaigns aim to “undermine the very notion 
of objective information or ethical journalism, casting all information as biased or as an 
instrument of political power, and which also target democratic values and interests” (EP 2016 
p. 2-3). Similarly, in its Action Plan against Disinformation, the Commission reiterated concerns 
that “democratic processes are increasingly challenged by deliberate, large-scale, and 
systematic spreading of disinformation” (European Commission 2018 p. 1). 
In this context, the EU has emphasized building societal resilience as a way to counter 
disinformation. In March 2015, the East StratCom Task Force was set up under the direction of 
the External Action Service (EEAS). East StratCom was given the task of addressing Russia’s 
disinformation campaigns and raising awareness about them (EEAS 2018). One of the main 
projects of East StratCom is EUvsDisinfo, which collects, publishes and ‘debunks’ Russian 
disinformation campaigns said to target the EU. It also has a weekly publication, the 
Disinformation Review, which summarizes the main disinformation ‘trends’ of the week. The 
project maintains social media pages on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube where its publications 
are promoted. Even though East StratCom forms part of the EU’s diplomatic service, the 
External Action Service (EEAS), the communications of EUvsDisinfo are directed to the Eastern 
Partnership countries and European citizens alike.  
EUvsDisinfo forms part of a wider EU strategy on building societal resilience against 
disinformation and other hybrid threats. To increase societal, the Commission has called for 
expanding the reach of “fact-based” information about the EU (European Commission 2019 p. 
5). This, according to the Commission, should be done by raising awareness of the issue of 
disinformation, enhancing media literacy and critical thinking skills among the European public, 
as well as efficient communication on the EU and its policies.  
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This thesis will critically analyze the work of EUvsDisinfo. In the following chapter, the 
background to the creation of the East StratCom Task Force and EUvsDisinfo will be introduced, 
beginning with the debate about hybrid threats, including disinformation, and how they should 
be responded to. Next, EUvsDisinfo and some of the problems associated with it will be 
explained in more detail. The third chapter will present the theoretical background through 
which the project will be analyzed. This section will focus on the concepts of ‘truth’ and the 
‘post-truth era’, and the debate about the role of truth and facts in democratic politics.  
The fourth chapter will present the analysis of the thesis; a content analysis of ‘disinformation 
cases’ published on EUvsDisinfo. The focus will be on cases that relate to the EU itself, and the 
counterarguments presented to them as ‘disproof’. The data consists of 210 cases collected 
from the website. The research questions that will be explored in the analysis are: How does 
EUvsDisinfo construct an image of the EU through the exposing and ‘debunking’ of 
disinformation cases?  What types of narratives about the EU are considered disinformation, 
and how are they disproved? The interest is on what kind of an image of the EU is presented 
through this project – what kind of narratives are chosen to be disproved and what kind of 
narratives are reinforced through the process. Finally, the wider implications of this approach 
to the problem of disinformation will be discussed in light of the debate on both information 
attacks as well as the concept of ‘truth’.  
 
2. Background to the creation of EUvsDisinfo 
 
Since the concept of hybrid warfare has become particularly prominent in the aftermath of the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014, the following chapter will briefly introduce the significance of the 
conflict for concerns about hybrid threats in general, and information attacks in particular. 
Next, the concepts of hybrid threats and disinformation will be explained in more detail. The 
aim is not to delve too much into the debate about whether or not the term hybrid threat is 
appropriate in the context of the threats that the EU is facing, but to set up the context in 
which the EU’s responses to this threat have been constructed, as well as to point to some of 
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the main critiques and problems associated with them, as these critiques apply to the work of 
EUvsDisinfo as well.  Finally, the East StratCom Task Force and EUvsDisinfo project, as well as 
previous academic research on their work, will be introduced.   
 
2.1. Increasing concerns about hybrid threats 
Analyses on hybrid threats often highlight the importance of the conflict in Ukraine in raising 
alarm about the potential increase in the use of different hybrid attacks, particularly 
disinformation. A European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) briefing called Ukraine 
Russia’s “biggest testing field abroad for disinformation” (EPRS 2018b p. 3). The use of 
information and psychological operations in the conflict in Ukraine has been considered central 
to Russia’s strategy and decisive for its success in the conflict. Crimea was annexed quickly and 
with relatively little military force, which raised concerns about the use of similar strategies in 
future conflicts.   
Russia used information attacks in Ukraine in numerous ways. Narratives were used to create 
multiple illusions about the war, such as stories of Russia’s non-involvement as well as its 
involvement on purely humanitarian grounds to protect an ethnic minority. Perhaps most 
importantly, narratives were central in framing events in a way that did not make the operation 
in Crimea seem like an occupation. Instead, the conflict was framed in terms Russia acting 
according to international law by protecting minorities and respecting the results of a 
referendum on the independence of Crimea and its accession to the Russian federation. 
(Pynnöniemi and Rácz 2016)  
Ukraine seems to have been a kind of textbook case of coordination of military and non-military 
means in the digital age. The strategies used in Ukraine and their success led to a “sense of 
novelty” for many observers (Nordberg 2014 et al. p. 45). A NATO StratCom Centre for 
Excellence (2014) report described the use of information attacks along with military action in 
Ukraine as characteristic of “a new form of warfare” in which “the main battle space has moved 
from physical ground to the hearts and minds of the population in question” (n.p.). A Swedish 
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Defense Agency report also described a “new situation in strategic affairs” where information 
could be a decisive element in conflict (Granholm 2014 p. 5). 
Yet others saw this sense of novelty as misleading. Charap (2015) argues that since the 
annexation of Crimea, “the concept of ‘hybrid war’ has emerged as a catch-all description for 
the new Russian threat to European security” (p. 51). The term has become so broad that it is 
used to explain almost any actions by Russia that are seen as threatening, and equates all of 
these with acts of war. These actions include “normal tools of statecraft” used to influence 
foreign populations, many of which are similar to influence operations of Western countries in 
Russia and elsewhere. In fact, Charap argues that both Russia and ‘the West’ use the term 
‘hybrid warfare’ to refer to similar actions of the other, but not themselves, and project onto 
the term anxieties about well-known vulnerabilities. In Russia, security analysts are concerned 
about the fragility of the political system as well as societal cohesion, and therefore assume 
that the West and NATO must be trying to take advantage of these weaknesses, just as in the 
West, analysts assume that Russia must be trying to manipulate and exacerbate existing 
divisions and vulnerabilities.  Similarly, Johnson (2018) claims that the concept of hybrid 
warfare has more to do with anxieties about the vulnerability created by the “appetites for 
sensational, inauthentic narratives” among Western audiences, rather than actual evidence 
that hybrid warfare is in fact being carried out.  
With regard to the idea that events in Ukraine may signal an increase in non-traditional, non-
military forms of warfare, analysts critical of the concept of hybrid war have argued that 
Ukraine was an exceptional case and unlikely to be repeated elsewhere in the near future. 
Charap (2015) for example, points to favorable conditions that made Russian information and 
psychological operations so successful in Ukraine, including a common language, historical and 
cultural ties, interpersonal connections among the populations, as well as the widespread 
resentment among the population of Eastern Ukraine towards the Ukrainian government (p 
54). 
However, while this is an important point, the argument in warnings in hybrid threats do not 
usually concern ideas about a repetition of the events in Ukraine. Rather, they point to a 
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concern about the potential use of information attacks as a way to gradually chip away at 
societal cohesion and stability. 
 
2.2. Defining hybrid threats 
 
There is no widely agreed definition for hybrid threats, and it is often used almost 
interchangeably with terms such as hybrid influencing, hybrid interference and even hybrid 
warfare. This poses a problem for analyzing the phenomena, and the term has been criticized 
for lacking analytical utility due to its ambiguity.  In the following section, I will discuss the 
definition of the term both by institutions as well as within the academic debate, including the 
problems and critiques of the term.  
The European Commission describes hybrid threats as “multidimensional, combining coercive 
and subversive measures, using both conventional and unconventional tools and tactics 
(diplomatic, military, economic, and technological) to destabilize the adversary.” They are used 
by both state and non-state actors and are typically associated with the information, cyber, and 
intelligence spheres. The aim is to undermine public trust in institutions and the political 
system, and to challenge the “core values” of the target society in order to weaken the state 
and its ability to react to threats. (European Commission 2018 p. 1)  
The European Center of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE), which was 
established in 2017 to facilitate cooperation between the EU and NATO in this area, adds a 
dimension to this definition. It defines hybrid threats as “coordinated and synchronized action, 
that deliberately targets democratic states’ and institutions’ systemic vulnerabilities, through a 
wide range of means” with the aim of influencing decision-making and harming the target 
society or state (Hybrid CoE 2019, n.p.).  The claim is that hybrid warfare is targeted against 
democratic states in particular.  
Key to hybrid threats is “remaining below the threshold of formally declared war” (European 
Commission 2016 n.p.). According to Jantunen (2015), hybrid attacks aim to cause a hybrid 
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condition in a target society, between war and peace. Hybrid war does not “look like war”, 
which makes it difficult to respond to, or even to agree whether it is taking place or not (ibid. p. 
40-41). Furthermore, it can appear as though this state of confusion is self-inflected or a result 
of internal divisions (Aaltola 2017). This characteristic of remaining below the threshold of war 
also makes hybrid threats difficult to define, and there is much disagreement about whether 
hybrid threats and hybrid attacks should be considered to be methods of hybrid warfare, or 
whether the broadening of the definition of warfare in this way is inappropriate. This is one of 
the main issues that make the term controversial; the use of the term “war” in situations with 
no physical violence or military force.  Renz and Smith (2015), for example, argue that the term 
war in hybrid war, if understood to refer to attempts to “influence public opinion or political 
processes” is only appropriate if it is meant “merely in the broadest metaphorical sense, similar 
to discourses like ‘war on poverty’” (p. 12). 
Aaltola et al. (2018) suggest the term “hybrid interference” to describe the current situation of 
Western democracies. According to the authors, Western democracies are being targeted 
through hybrid methods, but the use of the term “warfare” is misleading in the absence of a 
threat of the use of military force and can potentially escalate conflicts. Hybrid interference, in 
contrast, should be seen more as a form of sabotage; they are information-psychological 
operations that attempt to create or manipulate divisions in the target society (p. 9). However, 
this term, too, can be criticized for encompassing common influence attempts in world politics, 
aimed at interest maximizing and competition for power and resources (ibid. p. 113).  
EU publications on the issue stress that Russia uses hybrid attacks, particularly disinformation, 
for the goal of undermining the EU’s unity, destabilizing European societies and causing distrust 
towards democratic processes and institutions by “making democratic actors, systems and 
values appear less attractive through a number of overt and covert instruments” (EPRS 2018b 
p. 1). The Commission has stressed that disinformation undermines trust in institutions and the 
media, and is a threat to democracy, which depends on public debates and well-informed 
citizens (European Commission 2018a p. 1). Teija Tiilikainen, Director of the Hybrid European 
Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, argues that the legitimacy of elections is at 
stake if issues that guide people’s voting choices turn out to be manipulated by outside actors 
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(cited in Yle 2020). The idea of ‘planting’ mistrust from outside is a central theme in the 
literature on hybrid threats.  
While hybrid attacks are often thought to target democratic institutions, it has also been 
argued that democratic institutions in themselves make target states particularly vulnerable. In 
a report analyzing the threats of what they call “hybrid interference” to liberal democracies, 
Aaltola et al. (2018) argue that many characteristics of liberal democracies, meant to protect 
freedoms of individuals, may also protect hybrid attackers from being exposed. This is 
particularly visible with regard to information attacks; freedom of the press and the open 
information environment make liberal democracies an easy target for information interference 
because all viewpoints must be tolerated. This makes it easy for hostile actors to maintain a 
presence in the information sphere. Therefore, the value of pluralism and the competition 
between interest groups in the democratic system make democracies more vulnerable to 
hybrid threats (ibid. p. 32). Open political competition means there will always be some level of 
political conflict, and therefore, some division that can be exacerbated or manipulated to cause 
tensions in the target society. Hybrid attacks can therefore be used to manipulate the ability of 
the target society to manage divisions. By targeting societal cohesion and solidarity, which are 
central for balancing conflicting interests in a democracy and essential for democratic 
governance, a target society can be made more vulnerable to other attacks, such as influence 
attempts.  
Similarly, Sillanpää (2015) argues that the norm of accountability and transparency in the West 
with regard to political communication, while essential for democracy, “does not come without 
tactical costs” as it can be used malevolently to undermine public trust in institutions and to 
undermine credibility of leaders as well as decision-making processes. This is highlighted in the 
digital age, in which credibility can be lost much more quickly and easily. Furthermore, he 
argues that the constant flow of information makes the information sphere seem “fragmented 
and complicated”, making it more difficult to make sense of things, particularly if an adversary 
is intentionally creating distractions through “informational noise”. Sillanpää argues for 
strategic communication as a remedy for this; Western governments should communicate 
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strong and unifying narratives which could put “data fragments in comprehensible order” and 




The European Parliamentary Research Service, which publishes research to guide EU 
policymaking, defines disinformation as false information that is deliberatively deceptive, and 
serves a political purpose. Therefore, it differs from misinformation (false information in 
general) and misleading information not only in that it is deliberate, but because it forms part 
of a wider scheme of strategic influence (EPRS 2018b p. 1). Importantly, then, disinformation is 
defined according to its aims; unlike false information in general, disinformation has a 
particular, subversive aim.  
Problematically, in some EU documents on the topic, the terms disinformation and propaganda 
are used interchangeably (e.g. EP 2016). Pynnöniemi (2015) explains the difference between 
these two terms: similarly to propaganda, disinformation serves a particular objective, but this 
is usually simply to deceive or confuse, rather than to consolidate adherence to a certain idea; 
the aim is to cause chaos rather than order. It is also important to distinguish disinformation 
from another term that it is often conflated with, “fake news”. As Bennet and Livingston 
explain, fake news tends to refer to more sporadic falsehoods or even simple mistakes. 
Disinformation, on the other hand, is conceptualized as “more systematic disruptions of 
authoritative information flows” (p. 123). 
While Pynnöniemi uses the term “strategic deception” rather than disinformation to describe 
Russia’s actions against the EU in the information sphere, the phenomenon she describes is the 
same; the spreading multiple narratives and contradictory information in order to cause 
confusion. Unlike propaganda, then, the goal of disinformation (or strategic deception) is to 
create multiple different and contradictory “versions of reality”, thereby undermining trust in 
all information in general (p. 14).  Similarly, Jantunen (2015) argues that the aim is not 
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necessarily to convince the audience of any particular narrative – the impact of disinformation 
is in the “cumulative effect” of distrust created by the prevalence of conflicting narratives which 
can cause distrust, frustration and confusion (p. 30). Writing about disinformation from a war 
studies perspective, Jantunen argues that the utility of disinformation lies in the fact that 
setting the terms of an argument guides the direction of public discussion in the target state of 
issues of strategic importance.  
Disinformation is seen to be a central tool for hybrid attacks, as it can be used to cause 
confusion and distrust. As was discussed above, the key characteristics of hybrid threats are 
targeting a society’s ability to work together, sowing divisions, and weakening the capacity to 
respond to those same attacks – and thus creating a vicious cycle of distrust and destabilization. 
Disinformation can serve these goals by spreading narratives that push public debate as well as 
voter behavior in desired directions.  
The European Commission has emphasized that the systematic use of disinformation for hybrid 
attacks is easier than ever because of technological change that has created “personalized 
information spheres” and echo chambers in which existing biases are amplified. The concern is 
that information consumed online is not subject to the same rules on “impartiality, pluralism, 
cultural diversity, harmful content, advertising and sponsored content” that traditional media is 
(European Commission 2018a p. 1). The online media environment has thus created a favorable 
environment for “mass online disinformation campaigns” seeking to exacerbate divisions and 
societal tensions, both among the public, and between the state and the public (ibid. p. 2). The 
Commission has also raised concerns that disinformation may “diminish trust in science and 
empirical evidence” (ibid p. 2). As will be discussed in the theoretical background section of this 
thesis, the idea that the prevalence of disinformation has caused a break from an otherwise 
truth-based politics is very contested, but it is important to note that these concerns are voiced 
in various EU documents and are at the heart of the concern about disinformation. 
As with hybrid attacks, there is some confusion over the definition of disinformation, as well as 
its connection to hybrid threats or hybrid warfare. Disinformation is often used almost 
interchangeably with the concepts of information influencing and even information warfare. 
11 
 
The EP and Commission documents from 2016-2019 related to disinformation which were read 
for this thesis do not name the current situation of the EU as being the target of information 
warfare. However, in the literature on hybrid threats and disinformation, the term is sometimes 
used to describe a situation in which disinformation campaigns are used for the goals described 
above; to weaken and divide societies and to undermine their ability to respond to such attacks  
(e.g. Jantunen 2015). 
As with hybrid warfare, the concept of information warfare has been the subject of much 
criticism. An article from Politiikasta.fi asked several Finnish academics about the debate on 
information war. While the discussion was about information attacks in the context of Finland 
in particular, the responses bring up concerns that relate to the debate on a European as well 
as global scale. Pauli Kettunen argues that the term ‘information warfare’ is dangerous because 
the imagery of war may lead to an increase in state powers to determine what is considered 
real or correct information, and to regulate information. The term also implies a state of 
emergency, which could be used to constrain civil rights and freedoms. Noora Kotilainen raises 
the concern that the framing of the issue as information warfare could lead to a ‘totalization’ of 
public discussion, whereby articulating certain opinions or narratives is considered participating 
in an information war. Similarly, Heikki Patomäki criticizes the term for securitization and 
argues that defining particular arguments or perspectives as information warfare means 
rejecting not only the possibility that there could be any truth to such arguments, but also any 
possibility of engaging in dialogue with those presenting such arguments. (all cited in 
Politiikasta.fi 2016) 
These criticisms are very relevant to the arguments made in the literature on disinformation. 
Jantunen (2015), for example, claims that domestic actors, whether willingly or not, participate 
in information warfare by spreading disinformation, for example when sharing posts or articles 
on social media that form part of narratives used in the information warfare. Thus, information 
warfare is not something only imposed from the outside, but also domestic actors are seen to 
participate in it if they share ideas that are associated with narratives used in information 
attacks. Similarly, the European Commission has stated that disinformation campaigns are used 
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by both foreign and domestic actors (European Commission 2018a p. 2). This is significant 
because it implies a securitization of public debate. 
Securitization refers to a process in which a particular issue is defined and constructed as a 
security threat. In order to make an issue a security threat in the minds of the audience, an 
issue is framed in a way that communicates to the audience a sense of urgency and 
vulnerability, thus turning the issue into a perceived security threat. This, then, makes it easier 
to justify and legitimize actions taken to counter the threat. In short, a securitizing speech act 
changes the state of affairs from a state of security to insecurity and in that sense “remodels 
the context in which it occurs.” (Balzacq 2011 p. 11) 
For securitization, the audience is central  – the audience has to be convinced of the threat in 
order to legitimize actions taken to counter it. Securitization theory is therefore interested in 
the “performative dimension” of security and security threats. Here, the interest is on the 
“abductive power” of language, symbols, cultural meanings etc. In this sense, securitization is 
not about “an objective reality” but rather about the ways in which linguistic depictions shape 
our perceptions of threats (Balzacq 2011 p. 12). Securitization theory offers an important 
perspective for examining the discussion around information warfare and disinformation 
campaigns especially since the threat is wholly linguistic; arguments about information warfare 
typically associate particular opinions and narratives with a security threat. 
Another issue complicating the discussion around the threat of disinformation is that it is 
unclear how exactly it differs from “normal” influence attempts in world politics. Much of the 
scholarship would argue that the difference is in whether the effects this engagement are 
meant to be destabilizing; however, from the literature on hybrid and information attacks, it 
seems that disinformation tends to be associated with authoritarian governments only. For 
example, the US war on Iraq is not usually named in the literature on disinformation. The 
research tends to present the world as divided into democratic states characterized by 
freedom, and authoritarian states that aim to destabilize those democratic states.  
Aaltola (2017), for example, argues that recent elections both in the US and in Europe have 
shown “an emerging practice whereby autocracies meddle in democratic elections by hacking 
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data, scandalizing it through leaks, and amplifying the effect by creating intense cognitive flows 
of disinformation and distrust across social media” (p. 2). In this context, he argues, data is now 
similar in terms of geopolitical importance to control over natural resources.  “Data and content 
flow can be weaponized” due to their potential in manipulating people’s behavior (p. 3).  
Aaltola presents a model of election meddling, in which spreading disinformation is step one. 
During this stage, information is spread in a way that is intended to weaken trust in 
governments, media and other institutions. Besides trust, also cohesion of society is attacked 
by causing or exemplifying existing divisions. In this way, disinformation “lays the groundwork 
for further stages” (p. 3).  
While much of the criticism on the idea of disinformation and information warfare points out 
that the phenomena is nothing new or a normal part of geopolitics (e.g. Renz and Smith 2015), 
this point is usually acknowledged by researchers writing about these threats. Rather than 
claiming that the use of disinformation is something completely new, many authors point to the 
fact that information tools are evolving and moving increasingly into the digital sphere, which 
increases their reach and speed of action. The disagreement has more to do with the impact 
this may have and to what extent this is just the evolution of forms of public discussion, rather 
than forms of manipulation.  
Aaltola et. al. (2018) claim that while information influencing has always been a part of world 
politics, what is new about the current situation are the possibilities brought by technological 
advancements, as well as the societal change which is often referred to as “post-truth”, which 
has revealed the vulnerabilities of democracy to the manipulation of information, and through 
it, public opinion. The term post-truth will be discussed in more detail in the theoretical 
background, but from the perspective of hybrid threats and disinformation, the concept is 
important because it is often used to explain why contemporary societies are seen to be so 
susceptible to manipulation attempts.  
The concerns over disinformation are often linked to concerns about social media and its 
effects on democracy. Social media is increasingly connected to “political awareness and 
patterns of trust” – people get much of their information from there and therefore also voting 
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and other behavior is partly shaped through the content on these platforms  (Aaltola 2017 p. 3). 
Recently a key concern with the wider impact of the internet on democracy has been with the 
business models of social media companies which host such a significant amount of information 
flows. Because appeals to emotions, particularly negative ones, are very effective for engaging 
viewers and readers, there is an incentive for sensationalist or polarizing, or even false content. 
There is a concern that this attention-based business model is particularly susceptible to 
manipulation attempts (Nye 2018). In the “fragmented information sphere” in which much of 
what we see is designed to confirm “existing cognitive biases”, divisive issues are easier to 
exploit (Aaltola 2017 p. 3). 
 
2.4. East StratCom and EUvsDisinfo 
 
The concerns about the spread of disinformation campaigns led to the establishment of the 
East StratCom Task Force in 2015. The Task Force was mandated with the following three tasks: 
communication and promotion of EU policies in the Eastern Neighborhood countries; 
strengthening the media environment both in the Eastern Neighborhood as well as member 
states; and strengthening the EU’s capacity to detect and respond to Russian disinformation 
campaigns. Promotion of EU policies is done mainly through strategic communication 
campaigns. Strengthening the media environment includes supporting media freedom and 
independent media by financing and training of individual journalists. The EUvsDisinfo project 
was set up to address the task of raising awareness of the issue of disinformation and exposing 
and debunking pro-Kremlin narratives. (European Commission 2016) 
A number of EU documents commend the work of EUvsDisinfo, often citing the high number of 
disinformation cases that it has exposed and disproved. However, the quality of the work has 
rarely been addressed, as the effectiveness of the project has mostly been expressed in terms 
of quantity of disinformation cases ‘disproven’. The Commission, for example, comments in its 
Action Plan against Disinformation that the East StratCom Task Force has “analyzed and put the 
spotlight on over 4,500 examples of disinformation … uncovering numerous disinformation 
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narratives, raising awareness and exposing the tools, techniques and intentions of 
disinformation campaigns” (European Commission 2018c p. 6). Similarly, in a report about the 
EU’s responses to hybrid threats, the Commission highlighted the work of the East StratCom, 
claiming that it had “spearheaded work on forecasting, tracking and tackling disinformation” 
and that EUvsDisinfo has “significantly raised awareness about the impact of Russian 
disinformation” (European Commission 2018b p. 2). This report, too, goes on to mention the 
high number of individual disinformation the website has covered to show its success, giving 
the impression that it is very effective.  
Despite the mostly positive views on EUvsDisinfo’s work that is evident particularly from 
Commission reports, in 2016 the EP criticized EUvsDisinfo for the tone used in its publications. 
In a resolution on strategic communication, the EP demanded that the Task Force adhere by the 
standards of quality journalism and that the Disinformation Review be “drafted in an 
appropriate manner, without using offensive language or value judgements” (EP 2016).  
Overall, however, the EP has been very supportive of the project and has recommended 
increasing its funding. But the criticism is interesting because as will be discussed below, 
despite being a part of the EU’s diplomatic service, EUvsDisinfo does tend to use very 
judgmental language. Furthermore, the claim that EUvsDisinfo should adhere to standards of 
journalism shows the confusion in what exactly the role of EUvsDisinfo is, as it is not supposed 
to be a journalistic outlet. 
A controversy broke out in 2018, when East StratCom was sued by three Dutch news outlets 
which claimed they had been unfairly targeted and blamed EUvsDisinfo for interfering with 
freedom of speech and media pluralism. The news outlets were categorized as “disinformation 
outlets” in the database. The issue was also brough to the Dutch parliament which passed a 
motion to call on its government to demand the Task Force be shut down. Yet at the EU level, 
the Dutch government continued to support it and voted together with the rest of the member 
states to increase its budget (Birnbaum 2018). After this, EUvsDisinfo stopped using the label 
“disinformation outlet” for the websites where disinformation cases have appeared. The case 
brought up important questions about the role of EUvsDisinfo, and the EU by association, in 
legitimizing some narratives as truthful, and de-legitimizing others as disinformation.  
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A disclaimer was recently added to the website, which is now visible both on the front page of 
the Disinformation Database as well as next to all disinformation cases, which states: 
“Cases in the EUvsDisinfo database focus on messages in the international information 
space that are identified as providing a partial, distorted, or false depiction of reality and 
spread key pro-Kremlin messages. This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given 
outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally 
sought to disinform. EUvsDisinfo publications do not represent an official EU position, as 
the information and opinions expressed are based on media reporting and analysis of 
the East StratCom Task Force.1”  
The addition of this disclaimer is interesting for multiple reasons. Firstly, EUvsDisinfo now states 
that it includes in its database not only disinformation as defined as false or intentionally 
misleading but also “partial” depictions of reality, presumably meaning that they show only one 
side of an issue. Secondly, EUvsDisinfo has very much softened its practice from initially listing 
the sources of disinformation as “disinformation outlets” to stressing that just because an 
outlet is cited on its website, does not mean that it is pro-Kremlin or even that “it has 
intentionally sought to disinform.” This seems contradictory, as one of the key characteristics of 
disinformation has been said to be the intention of disinforming. Finally, the website now calls 
its publications information and opinions, whereas previously it has been claimed that the 
project simply checks facts and exposes disinformation (see EEAS 2018). 
 
 
2.5. Previous research on EUvsDisinfo 
 
So far, the project has not attracted much attention among scholars. Glorio (2018) analyzes 
EUvsDisinfo through propaganda analysis and the concept of hegemonic narratives, with a 
 
1 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/disinformation-cases/  
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focus on the role that fact-checking organizations can have in the political debate. As she points 
out, while EUvsDisinfo is not strictly considered a fact-checking organization, this role is very 
much implied in different EU documents regarding its work, as well as the EEAS website. 
Therefore, while not totally accurate, the comparison to fact-checking organizations is 
appropriate. She argues that fact-checking as a means of counter-propaganda can itself be used 
as a channel for propaganda, especially when used for strategic communication of states. 
Through a content analysis of publications from the Disinformation Digest publications (now 
called the Disinformation Review), which are weekly summaries published about the main 
disinformation ‘trends’, she argues that the project can be seen as a platform for counter-
propaganda, which presents a “heavily framed reality” of Russia and its actions towards the EU 
(p. 58). She concludes that “Western war on Russian propaganda has the risk of becoming a 
two-sided propaganda war” (p. 63).  
Wagnsson and Hellman (2018) analyze EUvsDisinfo in terms of its implications on the credibility 
of the EU as a normative power, meaning an actor that uses its influence through setting and 
spreading of norms in the international system, rather than through force. Their paper 
compares the rhetoric of Disinformation Digest publications to High Representative Mogherini’s 
speeches relating to Russia from the same time period. They conclude that while Mogherini 
emphasizes cooperation and dialogue with Russia, presenting it as an important partner, 
EUvsDisinfo takes an antagonistic and confrontational approach. It represents Russia in an 
explicitly negative way, constructing it as a threat and clearly contrasting it with the positive 
and ethical values it associates with the EU. They conclude that this shift in the EU’s external 
communication has “led to the EU losing reflexivity and normative power”, as instead of 
engaging in critical and constructive dialogue, the EU is engaging in the kind of aggressive 
“othering” that it criticizes Russia for (p. 1161). This can be seen, for example, in the tone of 
“sarcasm, irony or ridicule” with which the Russian narratives are presented in the Reviews (p. 
1170).  
Wagnsson and Hellman’s analysis therefore shows a clear divide between EEAS 
communications; while the High Representative favors constructive dialogue, the East StratCom 
Task Force, through EUvsDisinfo, is taking a very different approach. This, they claim, has led to 
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a “double track communication within the EU”, where different parts of its organizations are 
sending different and even contradictory messages (p. 1171). This brings up an important 
challenge in analyzing EUvsDisinfo: it is unclear exactly whose voice it represents. The website 
claims that it does not represent an official EU position, as it is only exposing disinformation, 
not publishing its own views or opinions (although as discussed above, the disclaimer on the 
website has recently been changed and now states that the website also presents opinions). 
EUvsDisinfo is a project of the EU’s diplomatic service (EEAS), and run by the East StratCom Task 
Force, which is a unit explicitly tasked with strategic communication of the EU (EEAS 2018). 
Furthermore, it is quite clear from reading the Disinformation Review that it is not only about 
exposing disinformation or even projecting a positive view of the EU, but it also constructs a 
particular view of Russia. Therefore, I agree with Wagnsson and Hellman’s decision to consider 
EUvsDisinfo “a strategic vehicle for EU messaging” (p. 1166) and will do the same in my own 
analysis. 
A yet more troubling piece on EUvsDisinfo was published by Hutchings and Tolz (2020), who 
conclude that the project is “in danger of becoming a source of disinformation itself” (n.p.). 
They analyze cases on the website related to COVID-19, comparing the original sources where 
they appeared to how they are presented in the EUvsDisinfo summaries. The paper finds that 
many of these were clearly misrepresented and taken out of context. They show numerous 
examples where the original article has cited a claim, and this claim is then presented as an 
argument of the article itself, even where it has clearly not been endorsed. They even find one 
example where an article “clearly ridiculing a whole series of international conspiracy theories 
regarding the origins of coronavirus” is flagged by EUvsDisinfo as promoting such conspiracy 
theories. Furthermore, Hutchings and Tolz claim that even where the original articles can 
legitimately be considered disinformation, they are presented in an “inflationary manner”, 
exaggerating their claims to make them seem even more outrageous.  
Furthermore, Hutchings and Tolz criticize EUvsDisinfo’s way of describing all the disinformation 
cases with the vague term “pro-Kremlin narratives”, which is used for anything from state-
funded media to small, independent websites which cannot be traced to “Russian state 
structures”. They argue that EUvsDisinfo shows clear signs of a “profound misunderstanding of 
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how the media in neo-authoritarian systems such as Russia’s work” and a common, mistaken 
belief about the extent of the Kremlin’s control over media and communication. This, according 
to the authors, is commonly overlooked in the information war narrative, which tends to 
exaggerate the ability of the Kremlin to control public discourse in Russia. However, it should be 
noted that strictly speaking, EUvsDisinfo does not claim that the sources of disinformation 
stories are necessarily controlled by the Kremlin, but that they advance the same goals as the 
Kremlin.  
Finally, Hutchings and Tolz argue that there is a tendency of EUvsDisinfo overstating the 
significance of the sources of the disinformation cases presented on the website; they often 
come from relatively small websites with small followings, yet are presented as though they 
were the mainstream view of Russian media in general. 
Hutchings and Tolz conclude that EUvsDisinfo cases are often misleading because they tend to 
misrepresent the original articles. Hutchings and Tolz identify both omission of information, as 
well as “blatant distortion” of the arguments made. While the study only considers EUvsDisinfo 
cases related to COVID-19, its findings are significant, because the project “bears the EU stamp 
of credibility” and is therefore increasingly a source for numerous news outlets publishing 
alarming accounts of Russia’s spreading of disinformation about COVID-19. The authors argue 
that EUvsDisinfo is harming the credibility of the EU “as an evidence-driven policymaker”. 
Furthermore, the authors claim that this type of communication risks escalating tensions on 
both sides and provides “valuable ammunition to Russian state media counterclaims that it is 
the EU itself which produces disinformation” which may lead to a “self-renewable dynamic” of 
accusations and rebuttals. They argue that while there is a need within the EU to research and 
understand disinformation cases, this work should be done much more carefully and 






3. Theoretical background 
 
The European Parliamentary Research Service warned the EP in 2018 of a “truth decay”, 
characterized by “a growing disagreement about facts; blurred lines between opinion and fact; 
increasing influence of opinion over fact; and declining trust in formerly respected sources of 
factual information” (EPRS 2018a p. 1). The report predicted that the decline of rationality and 
increase of “importance of emotions in political culture” were likely to continue. This situation 
was defined as “post-truth”. 
The EP has raised similar concerns about this phenomena and different aspects of it in 
numerous communications. In a 2016 resolution on countering ‘anti-EU propaganda’, the EP, 
although without using the term post-truth, raised concerns about the increasing susceptibility 
of EU citizens to disinformation. The resolution states that: 
“the financial crisis and the advance of new forms of digital media have posed serious 
challenges for quality journalism, leading to a decrease in critical thinking among 
audiences, thus making them more susceptible to disinformation and manipulation” (EP 
2016 p. 3).  
It is not stated how this decrease in critical thinking has been measured, and presumably it has 
not been. However, this passage raises an interesting point about the EU discussion on post-
truth and responses to it; the EP has made a connection between economic insecurity and the 
poor state of financing of media on the one hand, and the phenomena of ‘post-truth’ in the 
sense of distrust in official information on the other. Yet with regard to solutions to the 
problem, the focus seems to be on countering disinformation and promoting positive narratives 
about the EU. The Commission has emphasized the importance of raising awareness of 
disinformation and improving societal resilience through “empowering citizen and civil society 
and ensuring fact-based communications on the EU”, so that citizens would have a “better 
understanding of the impact of the EU on their daily life” (European Commission 2019 p. 5-6). 
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As will be explained below, many academics have raised similar concerns about the emergence 
of a post-truth politics, with various conceptualizations of the phenomena. However, these 
claims have also been met with much criticism. Perhaps most significantly, they are criticized 
for reducing the debate over complex issues and a condition of serious social insecurity to a 
simple true vs. false debate.  
Since much of the justification for the need for the EUvsDisinfo project centers around the 
argument that disinformation is causing confusion over facts and truth among the European 
public, a closer look at the concept of truth is in order. The theoretical background explored in 
the following chapter will introduce the conceptual framework through which the project will 
be analyzed. It will begin by discussing different theories of truth, and the relationship of truth 
to concepts such as facts, objectivity and rationality. These concepts are regularly mentioned in 
the post-truth debate, yet are often overlooked and sometimes even treated as synonyms. The 
point of the theoretical background is not to attempt a comprehensive account of truth 
theories, but rather to point to some of the main problems in theorizing truth and the 
validation of truth claims. Each of the broad categories of theories of truth include a wide range 
of viewpoints, all of which cannot be dealt with here. However, hopefully the chapter will shed 
light on the difficulty with the very attempt to define truth and evaluate different types of truth 
claims, as well as with attempts to fix the so-called post-truth problem with more “fact-based” 
information. 
Secondly, this chapter will discuss theories relating to the link between truth and democracy. 
This is central, because as has been explained in the previous chapter, the EU has justified its 
responses to disinformation in terms of the importance of trustworthy information for 
democracy and democratic decision-making. The tension between the freedom of information 
and participation in public discussion on the one hand, and the need for rational and efficient 
decision-making on the other, is particularly important. Finally, having mapped out the 
theoretical background, the debate on the post-truth phenomena will be discussed in relation 




3.1 Theories of truth 
 
One significant difficulty for conceptualizing the ‘post-truth’ era is that there is no consensus on 
truth itself. The meaning of truth may seem rather intuitive, and in many cases possibly as 
simple as the most traditional view, the so-called ‘correspondence theory’ claims: truth is a 
relation of correspondence between a proposition (or sentence/belief) to reality. In practice, 
however, comparing a truth claim and the facts in the world is rarely such a simple task. The 
question of exactly what the correspondence theory means in practice remains elusive, and 
theories of truth remain at odds with this question.  
The correspondence theory is often associated with realism. Realism sees truth through 
bivalence; an objective world exists independently of our propositions or beliefs about it, and 
our propositions are either objectively true or objectively false, depending on whether they 
correspond to reality. Truth is seen as wholly dependent on the objective world that exists 
outside of our views, thoughts, or propositions about it (Prado 2009 p. 2). Realism also claims 
that truth is transcendent, meaning all propositions are either true or false regardless of 
whether we know it. One of the most prominent contemporary realists, John Searle, sums up 
the realist view on truth as being simply an “accurate depiction of what is the case” (ibid p. 3).  
However, while intriguing in its simplicity, the realist view takes many things for granted. The 
decision of which facts are most relevant in each case is often a matter of interpretation. While 
in some domains or everyday events it may be easy to do this, in more complex cases, not all 
propositions are verifiable. Therefore, this simple procedure of checking the relation of 
correspondence applies only to some cases in some subject-matters, where we can clearly 
identify the corresponding fact. 
Realism has also been criticized for its lack of attention to the fallibility of knowledge and our 
ability to accurately represent reality. Realism presupposes a “semantically closed language”, 
where the meaning, and therefore also truth-value, of sentences can always be objectively and 
reliably assessed (Fuller 2018 p. 136).  
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Idealists came up with very different conceptualizations of truth, which stressed the role of 
ideas and knowledge in defining truth and truth-value. Idealism is not interested in the 
external, objective reality outside of human consciousness. This is because all knowledge about 
reality is always constrained by language and the limits of human consciousness; therefore, we 
have no unmediated access to an objective reality. So, while realists start with the assumption 
that people are able to represent the objective world accurately through their propositions 
about it, idealists claim that they can only represent ideas about the world, not the world itself. 
Therefore, truth is ontologically something very different from that of the realist view. For 
idealists, reality is “something like a collection of beliefs”, and therefore, criteria for truth 
claims can only come from other beliefs. (Young 2018 n.p.) 
Idealism is often associated with the coherence theory of truth. One of the early advocates of 
the theory was Hegel, who critiqued the realist approach to truth as unable to account for the 
nature of knowledge, and insisted that there was a clear separation between consciousness 
(which includes knowledge and experience) and reality. Reality is outside the mind, and 
knowledge is inside the mind, and the two will always be to some extent fundamentally 
separated from each other, and there is always the possibility of reality being distorted in 
knowledge. He saw language as a constitutive part of reality, and the contingency of language 
means that reality as we know it is itself contingent (Shomali 2010 p. 134-135). It is not possible 
to step outside of language and sociopolitical context and acquire a perspective “from which a 
final account of society/reality is possible” (Shomali 2010 p. 134). In Hegel’s view, given that the 
realm of experience and knowledge is “self-enclosed”, unable to capture the totality of reality, 
the correspondence theory fails to provide any certainty about how true statements could be 
validated in practice. (Shomali 2010 p. 12-13)  
According to the coherence theory of truth, a true statement must be coherent with a wider set 
of propositions or beliefs. Truth, then, is what is reached when this ‘criteria’ of coherence has 
been fulfilled (Shomali 2010). As the coherence theory determines the truth-value of a 
proposition in terms of its coherence with a larger whole, propositions are not seen as either 
true or false but in terms of their “degree of truth”, depending on to what degree they 
correspond to a whole. So, in contrast with the idea proposed in the correspondence theory, 
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truth is not a relationship of correspondence of individual propositions to individual facts that 
can be observed in the world. Instead, truth is about “how beliefs are related to each other”; it 
is a relationship between propositions (Glanzberg 2018 n.p.).  
While there are differences among coherence theorists, what they have in common is the idea 
that the truth-value of propositions is determined by other propositions, as opposed to 
‘objective facts.’ In a way, this is also a rather intuitive way to think about truth and probably 
applies to much of everyday thinking about truth; in most cases, we would not even attempt to 
check whether the information we receive corresponds to any objective facts. Instead, we tend 
to get information from secondary sources and believe things when they seem to make sense 
based on what we already know. However, this is inadequate for defining the nature of truth, 
and can only account for a plausible explanation for why we believe the things that we believe. 
A common criticism of the coherence theory is that just because we cannot know whether a 
proposition corresponds to reality, that should not be taken to mean that it in fact does not. 
But the coherence theory does not necessarily imply a rejection of the existence of an objective 
world; rather, the argument is that we have no unmediated access to it, because humans 
“cannot ‘get outside’ our set of beliefs and compare propositions to objective facts”, and 
therefore, have to rely on experiences, beliefs and obeservations (Young 2018 n.p.). So, while 
an objective world may exist, it does not follow that our knowledge can mirror it. Coherence 
theorists reject the basic tenets of realism about truth, according to which all propositions are 
either true or false, regardless of whether their truth-value can be known. Not every 
proposition coheres with a set of beliefs, and if it cannot be known whether a proposition is 
true or not, then calling it truth would be nonsensical (ibid.). 
While early versions of the coherence theory tended to view the nature of truth simply as the 
logical consistency of propositions, this view has largely been abandoned, as it lends itself to 
the easy criticism that even false beliefs could make up a coherent set of beliefs. Contemporary 
coherence theorists defend their view on epistemological rather than ontological grounds, and 
specify that the set of beliefs or propositions against which the coherence of a truth claim is 
evaluated should be one that has been reached through inquiry (Young 2018). But as Young 
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points out, they cannot account for which system of beliefs to measure truth against without 
conceding that objective facts do play some role, and conceding this would unravel the whole 
theory, which claims that truth is about beliefs, not objective facts. But if taken only as an 
epistemological claim, then the coherence theory does not actually challenge the 
correspondence theory. Coherence theory cannot challenge the ontological claim of the 
correspondence theory, unless it is to argue that “propositions cannot correspond to objective 
facts, not merely that they cannot be known to correspond” (ibid.). This, as an ontological claim 
would be unconvincing, yet without it the coherence theory does not really say anything about 
the nature of truth, only about our ways of validating truth claims.  
Another theory of truth that emerged to challenge the realist view is pragmatism. Perhaps even 
more than the coherence theory, pragmatic theories of truth are difficult to generalize and 
sometimes contradict each other. However, they are united in their focus on the practical value 
of truth. In contrast to the correspondence theory, which views truth “as a static relation” 
between propositions and reality, pragmatic theories view truth as a function of, for example, 
problem-solving, scientific inquiry, everyday conversations, moral judgements etc. (Capps 2019 
n.p.)  
Similarly to coherence theorists, pragmatists focus on the epistemic practices related to truth; 
how we come to consider things as true and how that impacts and guides the direction of 
inquiry (Capps 2019 n.p.). Similarly, pragmatists see truth as what is found at “the end of 
inquiry”; truth is what we have at a point where inquiry has been satisfied (Glanzberg 2018 
n.p.). They have criticized correspondence theory and realist views for not accounting for the 
value and role of truth and why truth should be pursued. But as pointed out before, the 
correspondence theory is not concerned with epistemology, while the pragmatist view of truth 
is very centered on epistemic practices. Unlike in correspondence theory, which sees truth as a 
relation, for pragmatism truth is about function and utility. Pragmatists do not necessarily 
reject correspondence theory outright, but critique it as “cut off from practical matters of 
experience, belief, and doubt” (Glanzberg 2018 n.p.).  
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As to the ontology of truth, pragmatists have criticized the correspondence theory as obscure 
because it depends “on an abstract (and unverifiable) relationship between a proposition and 
how things ‘really are’” (Capps 2019 n.p.).  Pragmatists tend to be skeptical of the metaphysical 
character of the correspondence theory and realism. Hilary Putnam, for example, has critiqued 
metaphysical realism for assuming a kind of “God’s Eye Point of View”, which is beyond the 
actual capacity of human beings to fully comprehend and explain reality in its totality.  Putnam 
differentiates between different kinds of truth; correspondence theory may hold true for some 
kinds of truths, but not others. Not all truths are true because of correspondence. If they were, 
then there could be no truth in ethical statements, for example, because they do not 
correspond to any uncontestable fact that would objectively prove them to be true. Putnam’s 
view is therefore pluralist; different kinds of truth are true for different kinds of reasons. In this 
way, he attempted to avoid the abstractness of the correspondence theory while still 
maintaining that truth itself is objective. So, the correspondence should not be generalized as a 
universal measure of truth, because there are other ways of being true, without a relation of 
correspondence to point to. (Capps 2019 n.p.) 
Similarly as Putnam, Richard Rorty rejected the idea that knowledge could ever perfectly mirror 
reality. He took the conclusion from this further, claiming that the correspondence theory 
should therefore be abandoned altogether. As Young (2018) argues, this view “seems to 
conflate truth with its justification, suggesting that if a claim meets contextual standards of 
acceptability then it also counts as true”. Rorty stressed the implications of language for the 
concept of truth. As he points out, we explain reality through language, and “only descriptions 
of the world can be true or false” (cited in Shomali 2010 p. 136). In other words, reality itself is 
not either true or false. While this may seem like common sense, it has important implications 
for how we think about truth. Truth, to Rorty, is not a “constitutive part” of reality (ibid p. 136).  
These traditional views on truth were upset in the mid-20th century with the emergence of the 
so-called postmodern turn in philosophy and social science. Postmodern views on truth are 
often associated with relativism. Relativists pointed to the multitude of contradictory and even 
incompatible ways that different societies have come up with for conceptualizing truth and 
concluded that there “can be no framework-independent vantage point” from which truth 
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claims can be assessed; truth is always related to a particular epistemic system (Baghramian 
and Carter 2018 n.p.). Therefore, there is no absolute, universal truth, but rather many truths, 
which depend on perspective, conceptual frameworks, scientific paradigms, etc. For relativists, 
reality does not exist independently of our ways of interpreting it, but rather is constantly being 
constructed by the claims we make (Glanzberg 2018). Unlike the realist view, in which truth is 
seen as a relation to the real world, or the idealist view, in which it is a relationship between 
ideas, for relativism, truth is “wholly linguistic”; it does not exist beyond language (Prado 2009 
p. 2). Due to the multitude of equally valid ways to produce and validate truth claims, relativists 
consider there to be “no meta-justification of our evaluative and normative systems” 
(Baghramian and Carter 2018 n.p.). 
Relativists also tend to view knowledge production and claims of objective truths as inherently 
tied to power and ideology, and the idea of single, universal truth as a tool for legitimizing and 
perpetuating societal power structures. In fact, relativism is often defended on normative 
grounds, as the most tolerant and open-minded approach in a world characterized by vast 
diversity. (Baghramian and Carter 2018). 
The influence of Michel Foucault in this ‘postmodern turn’ can hardly be overstated. Foucault is 
among the most cited authors in the social sciences. Foucault conceptualized truth as a social 
construction that was essentially tied to power, and saw truth in terms of truth regimes. His 
power/knowledge concept emphasized the need to focus on explaining how truths are 
constructed and the effect that they have on relations of power. Rather than theorizing the 
ontology of truth, Foucault pointed to the ways that the concept of truth is used to organize 
society in particular ways. Therefore, more important than the philosophical debate on the 
nature of truth was the investigation into the power effects of the ability to produce truths. In 
this view, “truth is wholly discursive and, as discursive, neither succeeds nor fails in depicting 
what is the case in extralinguistic reality” (Prado 2006 p. 3). He used the concept “regimes of 
truth” to describe the dominant forms of knowledge and authority that determine what is 
considered to be the truth in a given place and time. Truth, for Foucault, is always relative to 
the particular truth regime that it has been produced in. (Prado 2006) 
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Relativism is often criticized for incoherence. The most obvious incoherency is perhaps its self-
refutation (if there is no truth then the claim that there is no truth is also not true; and if true 
claims are only true in their particular epistemic frameworks then the relativist view on truth is 
also only true within the relativist framework). It can also be seen as ‘explaining away’ complex 
debates; the vast diversity of opinions, cultures and worldviews, as well as the fallibility of 
human knowledge are taken by relativists to mean that a single, universal standard for truth 
cannot exist. But this can also be seen as an easy way to avoid the question of the nature of 
truth altogether. 
While the ontological views of relativism may be incoherent, relativism offers a useful way to 
think about epistemology, and the epistemological claim that knowledge is contingent and 
socially constructed has been adopted by many other approaches. But the problem with the 
relativist view is that is that it endorses not only epistemological relativism, but ontological 
relativism. From observing the contingent, ever-changing nature of knowledge it concludes that 
reality must also be equally contingent, as it is produced by knowledge.  
A central counterargument to the relativist outlook on truth is that other approaches, too, 
acknowledge that our ways of knowing about the world, including in the scientific domain, are 
not value-neutral or objective. But while science and knowledge are always tied to historical 
contingencies, and this affects our knowledge of the world, it does not determine it (Glanzber 
2018). From the perspective of critical realism, for example, the correspondence of truth claims 
to reality is seen metaphorically. Adopting ontological realism but a relativist epistemology, 
critical realism asserts that an objective world exists independent of our knowledge about it, 
yet knowledge about it is always “socially produced, contextual and fallible”, and therefore, 
relative. However, despite this “interpretative pluralism”, claims to truth should be judged 
through judgmental rationalism, which implies rational development of scientific practices and 
openness to learning and opposing viewpoints or evidence (Patomäki 2002 p. 8-9).  
Theories of truth depend much on what assumptions about the capacity or lack thereof that 
people have for acquiring knowledge of external reality. Yet truth theories tend to be quite 
ambiguous, and it is often not said explicitly which aspect of the concept of truth is being 
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discussed or debated; namely the nature of truth, or the standards for evaluating truth claims. 
This is a central point made by Kirkman (1992), who criticizes the philosophical debate on truth 
for vagueness and ambiguity, claiming that writers on the subject tend not to be specific about 
what kind of questions about truth they are addressing. Different theories of truth focus on 
different questions about truth, and do not necessarily contradict with other theories as much 
as is often thought. They are simply writing about different aspects and issues about truth, but 
because writers often fail to “make clear what [their] own conception of the problem is”, it is 
difficult to make sense of the overall debate (Kirkman 1992 p. 1). 
To better make sense of truth theories, Kirkman suggests a division between theories of truth 
according to the central “projects” that have guided them, which can be divided into three 
broad categories. Firstly, the “metaphysical project” focuses on “what truth consists in, what it 
is for a statement … to be true” (for example, correspondence to reality, coherence, or utility, 
as argued by the approaches discussed above). Here, what is important is what it is in the world 
that makes propositions true. Secondly, the “justification project” focuses on establishing 
criteria for assessing truth claims, attempting to determine the particular characteristics that 
true statements must possess, and how they can be validated in practice. Lastly, the “speech-
act project” focuses on what purpose truth as a property serves. (Kirkman 1992 p. 20-21). 
When viewed in this way, the different approaches to truth discussed above all have different 
strengths. Realism can account for more evident truth claims, where a statement and a fact can 
be reliably compared. Yet the approach does not seem to make sense for accounting for the 
truth-value of more interpretative statements. With moral truths, a coherence theory or 
pragmatist view may make more sense. Yet these approaches have trouble explaining what it is 
exactly that makes claims true, and how they relate to facts in the world. Relativism, in turn, 
has made important contributions to the understanding of the effects and purposes that the 
concept of truth may serve.  
Another aspect that is often not clear in the debate about truth is what is meant by concepts 
such as objectivity and facts. All these terms are central for theories of truth, but often go 
without much explanation – yet the views on what these terms mean can change a whole 
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perspective on truth. They are also often not well-explained when talking about ‘opposite’ 
views to that of the author. 
Wight (2018) points to the problem of the term ‘objectivity’ being used in two different ways. 
The first understanding of objectivity is “a process where decisions and/or judgments are 
based, as much as possible, on facts and not personal beliefs or feelings”, and which requires 
attempting, as much as possible, to maintain an unbiased stance. It is more of an ideal, as 
absolute objectivity is probably out of reach. Rather, in this sense, objectivity is something to 
strive for. However, there is a second, common use of the term, where objectivity is taken to 
mean “something that is beyond dispute; the objective facts, for example; something beyond 
any and all doubt” (p. 20).  
Facts, on the other hand, are conceptualized as social constructions used to describe the world 
and to communicate information about it. Facts are used to express a relationship between a 
claim and a state of the world. Importantly, they form part of language, rather than existing in 
their own right; “If there were no humans … there would be no facts” (Wight 2018 p. 22). 
Therefore, facts should not be thought of as ‘objective’ in the sense of something beyond 
dispute; they can always potentially be proven wrong by new or improved information. Yet, by 
definition, a fact implies some degree of certainty; “What makes something a fact is that it 
captures some features of the world to which it refers” (ibid p. 22). Which facts matter for a 
particular truth claim, however, is always open to interpretation. 
 
3.2. Truth and democracy 
 
Truth and democracy are closely connected in democratic theory. Habermas, for example, has 
argued that a “post-truth democracy … would no longer be a democracy” because truth, reason 
and learning are indispensable to democracy (Habermas 2006 p. 18). As was discussed above, 
this claim has been echoed by the EU, as well as national European leaders. President Macron, 
for example, declared in a speech in 2018 that “without reason, without truth, there is no real 
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democracy because democracy is about truth and rational decisions.” He claimed that 
disinformation is harmful to democracy because it “exposes our people to irrational fear and 
imaginary risk” (cited in Farkas and Schoul 2019 p. 1).  
Particularly deliberative democracy has associated democratic politics with the search for truth. 
In this view, free deliberation in the public sphere is the best way to ensure rational and fact-
based decision-making. As a theory, deliberative democracy borrows from the work of 
philosopher Hannah Arendt, who argued that the concept of plurality, a fundamental 
characteristic of the human condition, is at the heart of democratic politics, which is about 
managing the inherent differences between people and their views and interests. The debate 
between people in the public sphere, or polis, is what “makes meaning and truth content 
possible in the first place” (Shomali 2010 p. 3). Arendt did not elaborate much on a theory of 
truth, but saw ‘facts’ as the building blocks of reality, which make it possible for dialogue to 
occur. According to Arendt, it is the common, shared understanding of factual reality that forms 
the basis on which truly free opinion formation is possible. Facts both limit and enable opinion 
formation and informed debate. As she stated, “[f]reedom of opinion is a farce unless factual 
information is guaranteed and the facts themselves are not in dispute” (Arendt 2006 p. 234). 
Arendt was concerned about the tension between truth and politics. In her book Between Past 
and Future, published in 1961, she observed in political discussions a “tendency to transform 
fact into opinion, to blur the dividing line between them”. Here, it is important to note that she 
differentiated factual truth from, for example, philosophical truth. Factual truth, as she 
explains, “is established by witnesses and depends upon testimony; it exists only to the extent 
that it is spoken about, even if it occurs in the domain of privacy” (Arendt 2006 p. 233-234). She 
considered factual truths to be the most important ‘kind’ of truth for politics because facts form 
the basis upon which opinions and explanations are formed. In other words, factual truth exists 
at the beginning of debate, and allows the formation of other ‘types’ of truth. 
Linking truth and democracy has been criticized particularly by scholars adopting more relativist 
ideas of truth. Critically analyzing the current discourses about post-truth and democracy from 
a post-foundationalist perspective, Farkas and Schoul (2019) argue that equating truth and 
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reason with democracy leads to the argument that re-establishing democracy “means 
eliminating … falsehoods” (p. 5). This, they claim, is problematic from the perspective of 
freedom of speech as well as political plurality. For Farkas and Schoul, the essence of 
democracy is quite different from that of those focusing on the importance of rationality. 
Basing their argument around Chantal Mouffe’s conceptions of democracy, they argue that: 
“What remains proper to a well-functioning democracy is not so much its ability to 
navigate based on reason and truth, but its ability to include and give voice to different 
political projects and groups. Democracy is about different visions for how society should 
be organized.” (p.7) 
Farkas and Schoul criticize narratives about post-truth for neglecting the fact that democracy 
should naturally include clashes of competing ideas. Farkas and Schoul’s view on truth and 
democracy echoes that of Michel Foucault, who focused on the power effects of claims to truth 
and considered claims to truth in the political realm to be a threat to democracy. His view 
focuses on the way that the production of truths and facts also produces reality, and therefore, 
any claims about absolute truths also cement the reality in which we live, limiting the possibility 
of new ideas that would challenge established truths.  
These views see democratic theories, particularly deliberative democracy, as having a 
“rationalist bias”, favoring reason and rationality over other important aspects of discussions, 
such as emotions. According to Dahlgren (2006), this rationalist bias also tends to undervalue 
other modes of communication, such as artistic or humorous communication, which may be 
just as important for democracy as reason or rationality. However, it seems like there is no 
reason why competing ideas and rationality could not coexist, particularly if we see rationality 
as openness to criticism, learning and dialogue, as suggested by Patomäki (2002).  
Another significant criticism of deliberative democracy is that it tends to ignore the fact that 
linguistic competency is not distributed evenly among people and therefore a free public 
sphere is no guarantee for all people to have their voices heard. Communicative situations are 
also shaped by relations of power between people. In this way, the emphasis on rationality may 
benefit those already in power. (Kohn 2000) 
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While deliberative democrats consider debate and discussion to be central to democracy, and 
to at least bring political decision-making closer to the truth, more skeptical views emphasize 
the role of vote-counting, and its implications for the role of truth in politics. According to Yack 
(2012), democratic processes actually undermine truth-seeking. He claims that democracy is 
dominated by rhetoric, which he defines as persuasion and manipulation. He claims that the 
basic tenant of democracy, the equal right to vote, incentivizes those running for office to speak 
in ways that appeal to the public through persuasion. In his view, a majority of votes is not 
accomplished by the most logical or rational arguments, but by those that come across as the 
most appealing and attractive. Rather than challenge the “commonly held premises” of the 
public, politicians will base their arguments on these same premises, presenting policies in 
terms of how they conform with “already valued practices” (p. 168). In other words, democratic 
decision-making actually perpetuates established practices and values, and slows the possibility 
of change, due to the dominant role of rhetoric (seen as strategies of pandering, manipulation 
etc. as opposed to logic, analysis etc.) in political speech. Legitimacy of decision-making in 
democracies depends on the principle of popular consent, which in turn incentivizes rhetorical 
competition at the expense of truthful and direct speech. 
Yack’s argument is that in democracies, the search for truth is undermined by “the search for 
some form of mutual accommodation” (p. 166). To be clear, he does not advocate for any non-
democratic form of decision-making in order to fix this issue, but instead basically claims that 
we should accept the fact that democracy will not produce the most truthful outcomes, and a 
fundamental tension between truth-seeking and democratic decision-making is inevitable. 
The argument made by Yack is a very common one, and theories of democracy have struggled 
to reconcile the commitment to democratic decision-making on the one hand and the view of 
the majority of people as prone to manipulation on the other. This suspicion seems to be 
heightened in the digital age, where endless information flows and personalized content have 
been seen to contribute to a “post-truth” politics. In one view, the internet is seen to have 
expanded the public sphere to include more people who might not have been involved in public 
discussions otherwise, lowering the threshold to share ideas. However, it has been argued that 
the already clustered and fragmented public sphere is further dispersed on the internet and 
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therefore, people may not actually be exposed to more difference and pluralism, but possibly 




In 2016, Oxford Dictionary named post-truth the word of the year. This much-cited dictionary 
entry defined post-truth as “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in 
shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Oxford Languages 2016 
n.p.). There are a number of problems with this definition. As has been demonstrated by the 
earlier sections of this chapter, the concept of objective facts is by no means unproblematic, 
and neither is the role of emotion and personal belief in politics. Perhaps most problematically, 
however, as Niiniluoto (2019) points out, the term ‘truth’ is not mentioned at all. This is a 
common and significant problem with the post-truth literature; the question of what ‘truth’ in 
the term post-truth means is rarely addressed.  
Particularly in the aftermath of the Brexit vote and Trump’s election, there have been claims 
that elections are increasingly won with appeals to emotions, as opposed to fact-based 
information and rational debate. Writing about the phenomenon specifically in the context of 
Brexit, Drieschova and Marshall (2018) define post-truth politics as a “new form of politics” in 
which political communication intentionally seeks to provoke emotional reactions, because this 
kind of communication is more engaging (p. 90). According to the authors, post-truth politics 
has emerged because of two, interrelated  factors: the changing media environment and “a 
growing distrust in democratic institutions, political elites, expertise, and traditional media 
gatekeepers” (p. 89). The article laments the loss of “respect for traditional elites and 
gatekeepers” and “established expert knowledge” which has made the public increasingly 
susceptible to believe inaccurate information that appeals to their emotions. The way that 
people make decisions is seen to have changed; voters in the post-truth era now “make 
emotionally charged and value-laden decisions” (p. 101). Drieschova and Marshall observe a 
clear break with the past, identifying the lies that were used to justify the US invasion of Iraq as 
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the turning point after which Western publics have been becoming more distrustful towards 
their leaders. 
A similar case for conceptualizing the term post-truth in terms of a break with the past is made 
by Bennet and Livingston (2018) in an article that can be found in the EUvsDisinfo website’s 
‘resources on disinformation’ section. They cite the mid-to-late 19th century as the “high 
modern period of democracy”, an era during which institutions enjoyed a high level of public 
trust and public authorities were seen as a reliable source of information (p. 127). They cite 
Eurobarometer polls showing falling trust in national parliaments and governments as evidence 
of a post-truth era. Similarly to Drieschova and Marshall (2018), they see lack of trust as an 
essential part of post-truth era, which is threatening the legitimacy of democracy. In this view, 
in the past, the “combination of higher trust and fewer public information sources enabled 
both authorities and the press to exercise more effective gatekeeping against wild or dangerous 
narratives from the social fringes or foreign adversaries”, whereas today, the situation is much 
more volatile and has enabled undemocratic forms of “counter politics” (p. 128). 
These arguments are very similar to those made in EU communications related to 
disinformation (e.g. EP 2016; European Commission 2018a). They link very closely to the idea of 
democratic politics being about the authority of rationality and science over emotions and 
personal values. They paint a picture of Western democracy as a linear path towards progress, 
now interrupted by a sudden and undesirable change in the public’s attitudes. But this 
argument does not hold up when considered from a historical point, of the long history of views 
of the public as dominated by irrational thinking and neglecting fact-based information. Korvela 
(2016; 2017), for example, argues that Western political thought has throughout its history 
demonstrated a distrust towards the ‘emotional’ and ‘irrational’ publics who are easily 
manipulated to make the wrong political choices. This has been contrasted against the need for 
leadership based on rational, fact-based decisions. Rather than being a new phenomenon, 
Korvela and Vuorelma (2017) claim that particularly since 2016, the repeated shocks in 
international politics have caused a feeling of some kind of transformation, and the 
interpretation of this phenomena as a move towards a post-truth era was quickly adopted 
without much critical analysis. Ironically, then, the idea of post-truth can itself be seen as a 
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“post-truth concept”; it is based on feelings and opinions about the current moment in history, 
rather than reliable evidence based on a historical perspective (see also Vuorelma 2017). 
Korvela and Vuorelma argue that in addition to being ahistorical, what tends to be forgotten in 
the discussion about post-truth is that language and rhetoric have always been used in ways 
that are now seen as part of “post-truth” politics (deceive, threaten, anger, etc.) (p. 8 ).  
Korvela and Vuorelma (2017) also point out that the concept of post-truth can be seen as a 
political act which assigns importance to the defining issue of the time – at the same time, 
ruling out others as less important (p. 21). The term can be used to delegitimize certain ideas 
and worldviews, while legitimizing others. It also creates an idea of a division between those 
defending truth and those defending falsehoods. Korvela and Vuorelma see the idea of post-
truth as speech constructing a threatening image in which Western democracy is threatened (p. 
9).  
Similarly, Farkas and Schoul (2019) argue that declaring a crisis of truth “is itself a deeply 
political act” (p. 10). They claim that the idea of post-truth, as a “discursive formation”, implies 
that there was once a truth era of democracy, which has been lost and has to be recovered in 
order for society to get back on track. A truth era, however, has never existed, and implying 
that it did involves “erasing long historical struggles of disenfranchised groups, such as racial 
minorities, to be acknowledged as part of the democratic populace” (p. 4).  
It is certainly difficult to see how a ‘truth era’ could be considered to ever have existed; we only 
need to look at the history of disinformation about issues such as climate change or the 
production of biased, industry-funded scientific research about the health impacts of consumer 
products such as cigarettes, to see that the systematic production of disinformation for the 
purpose of manipulating the direction of public discussion as well as political decision-making is 
nothing new. However, as Hyvönen (2016) points out, the concept of a post-truth era does not 
need to make an assumption of a previous “truth era” in which truth somehow flourished. 
Hyvönen agrees that lies and deception have always been present in politics, but this in itself in 
no way means that there is nothing new about the current context. He argues that more 
important for the concept of post-truth is the seemingly increasing indifference towards facts 
37 
 
and truth. What is important here is what kind of value is given to honesty in politics and what 
the consequences are for being caught in lies. Here, he claims, there is a worrying tendency. 
Post-truth is therefore not about people being willing to believe lies, but about not even caring 
about truth, which has led to a situation in which increasingly, there are almost no 
consequences for being caught in a lie in politics. In sum, post-truth for Hyvönen is the 
“devaluation of factual truths in public debate”, as evidenced particularly by the situation of the 
US, but also increasingly in other Western democracies (Hyvönen 2018 p. 48). 
Hyvönen sees post-truth as a process, which can be traced back to economic and cultural 
factors that “erode the ‘common world’ and make truth increasingly irrelevant in public 
discourse”. It is characterized by “careless speech” by politicians, defined as speech that is 
indifferent to the truth-value of claims as well as public deliberation, debate and engagement 
with other perspectives (Hyvönen 2018 p. 33). The real meaning of claims made in political 
speech is not only left unclear but is treated as unimportant. Careless speech does not seek to 
persuade, but rather to “create confusion and bring democratic debate to a halt” (p. 33). So, as 
he points out, his way of seeing post-truth differs from the idea of post-truth as the death of 
expertise or the domination of emotions over facts. Firstly, there is no prioritization of facts 
over emotions; “Defending truth might involve as much emotion as violating it” – so emotions 
and facts should not be presented as opposites in this way. Both have an important and 
legitimate place in public debate and democratic decision-making. Instead, Hyvönen is more 
concerned with the particular uses of appeals to emotions in politics. As has been evident in the 
use of lies by the Trump administration, he argues that the most “potent examples of post-
truth politics” are those in which “outright lies about things that technically anyone could verify 
are used … for various political purposes”, such as the denial of obvious or trivial matters of 
fact. He argues that such claims “seek to make ‘normal’ political debate and critical scrutiny of 
policies impossible” (p. 39). 
The main issue here is with what Hyvönen calls “factual truths” – and particularly those factual 
truths that are easily verifiable. In an Arendtian view, he is concerned with the consequences of 
denying these kinds of facts for the ability of people to form opinions about them. He sees facts 
as the “immaterial infrastructure” of politics, which help define the situation in which a debate 
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is happening and form the basis from which opinions and views are formed. This, as he 
emphasizes, should not be seen as an argument for totally ‘objective’ facts;  differing 
interpretations about the meanings of facts are a given. The concern over disagreement over a 
common basis of facts should not be interpreted, as many critics of the concept of post-truth 
seem to imply, as a call for “hegemonic narratives” but instead can be viewed from the 
perspective of ensuring pluralist debate. (Hyvönen 2016) 
Similarly, Wight (2018) argues that the phenomena of post-truth does not emerge from the 
production of lies or disinformation, but from “the realm of reception”, as publics are 
increasingly responding to the issue of truth-value with indifference. However, he traces the 
source of the problem to the social sciences itself, where postmodernism and its relativist ideas 
of truth have become prominent and also gained influence outside of academia. In light of this, 
Wight argues that the post-truth era is a kind of self-inflicted wound, resulting from the 
direction that the social sciences have taken in the past few decades. In this view, the ideas of 
postmodernism, including a suspicion or even rejection of the very notion of objective truth, 
are to blame for the post-truth era. 
Already in 2004, before the concept of post-truth became so widely used, in an essay titled 
“Why has criticism run out of steam?”, Bruno Latour, a long-time contributor to social 
constructivist theory, lamented what he saw as a misuse of the insights of the approach by 
“dangerous extremists” now advocating a total rejection of scientific evidence (p. 227). Latour 
argues that the questioning of truth in social sciences has led to a weakening of the field’s own 
ability to critique existing knowledge and to produce new knowledge. The “lack of scientific 
certainty” is now made a central issue, used to undermine scientific evidence by emphasizing 
the fact, brought up by social scientists themselves, that all knowledge is always incomplete. 
This, according to him, has led to excessive distrust towards all knowledge. Relativism, which 
Latour himself promoted, showed that “we are always prisoners of knowledge”, and that point 
came to be used as a basis for rejecting the whole concept of scientific evidence. But this, 
according to him, was never the aim. Questioning the sources and authority of knowledge, and 
the universality of truth, was intended to lead closer to truth. However, Latour claims that the 
opposite has happened; the same Enlightenment values and practices that empowered people 
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to debunk widely-held beliefs were “totally disarmed once matters of fact, in turn, were eaten 
up by the same debunking impetus” (Latour 2004 p. 228).  
Niiniluoto (2019) argues that the intention of the critique of Enlightenment thinking that 
postmodernists are associated with was not about rejecting principles such as rationality, 
democracy or freedom of thought but about questioning the success with which they were 
achieved. Yet according to Niiniluoto, this critique brought about an “anti-truth” and nihilistic 
form of social constructivism in the social sciences. Similarly to Wight, he argues that these 
views spread from the social sciences to society, and the attitude towards truth that it 
advocated, combined with other features of our time like populism and social media, have led 
to a situation of increasing disregard for truth.  
Many scholars have defended postmodern thought against this accusation, claiming that these 
views misunderstand the intentions of postmodern writers. Prozorov (2018), for example, 
separates relativism from postmodernism altogether. He claims that post-truth is mistakenly 
being attributed to the rise of post-structuralist and postmodern political philosophy in the 60s 
and 70s, which is claimed to have contributed to a suspicion towards “the authority of truth 
and the scientific method” (n.p.). Through an analysis of Michel Foucault’s views on truth, he 
argues that the point was to question and contest regimes of truth, rather than the existence or 
value of truth itself. Post-truth, on the other hand, is not about “problematizing discourses of 
truth but rather [a] tendency to devalue truth as such, to reduce all truth to opinion, which can 
be neither true nor false, and whose contestation is therefore meaningless.” He claims that the 
reduction of truth to private interests and opinion, characteristic of “post-truth political 
culture”, is incompatible with the thought of postmodern writers such as Foucault. 
Similarly, Tallis (2016) argues that the postmodern concept of truth has been hijacked, taken 
out of the original context of what postmodern writers meant. The problem here is not the 
challenging of the concept of truth, which is seen to be part of a healthy philosophical debate, 
but the specific ways it is being used in intolerant and cynical, aggressive ways. He claims that 
post-positivist (including postmodern) research “seeks to produce ‘trustworthy and persuasive’ 
knowledge about the complex and plural meanings of people’s relation to their social 
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situations” whereas post-truth politics is about “outright lies, empirical falsehoods and 
misleading associations” (p. 9). This self-serving and dishonest form of politics, according to 
Tallis, differs completely from the attempt of postmodernists to call attention to the plural 
meanings of truth, the contingency of meaning and facts, in order to challenge dominant ways 
of thinking. 
It seems difficult to deny that the postmodern claim to the relativity of truth would not have 
benefited the development of a ‘post-truth’ era in which the concept of truth and facts are 
neglected, yet it would be unfair to blame postmodernism itself for this. As Wight states,  
“[w]hich facts matter, and what to make of them, is always a matter of interpretation. 
Thus, post-truth finds intellectual legitimation in the necessary and critical approach to 
the construction of knowledge that is an essential element of academia” (Wight 2018 p. 
23).  
Postmodernism was right to point out the power dimension related to the concept of truth. As 
Tallis has argued, “perhaps the problem is not so much postmodern destabilization of ‘truth’” 
but what has been done with that insight (cited in Michelsen and Tallis 2018). Similarly, 
Prozorov argues that the postmodern turn leveled “the epistemological playing field”, opening 
access to more viewpoints challenging authority on knowledge production. While this has had 
positive impacts, Prozorov claims that the problem is now that “anti-progressive post-truthers” 
have used these important ideas for entirely different goals, closing down debate rather than 
opening it up and democratizing it. 
Perhaps the most important concern brought up by scholars critical of the concept of post-truth 
is that it tends to imply a scenario where one party has authority to define what the truth is in 
particular matters, while the other is perceived as defying this. This point is particularly 
important for EUvsDisinfo as the disinformation narratives it seeks to impose are far from the 
type of facts that can simply be ‘checked’ for correspondence, such as dates or direct 






The following chapter will analyze the way that EUvsDisinfo constructs an image of the EU 
through the disinformation stories that it publishes and ‘debunks.’  This will be done through a 
content analysis of the disinformation cases published in the ‘Disinformation Database’. The 
interest is on which kind of stories are flagged as disinformation, what kind of arguments are 
presented as evidence that the stories are false, and what kind of narratives about the EU are 
created or reinforced in the process. 
A total of 210 publications were analyzed, with the timeline ranging from the creation of 
EUvsDisinfo in June 2015 to August 2020. The cases were chosen by searching for “European 
Union” in the Disinformation Database and discarding those cases that were not directly related 
to the characteristics of the EU and its institutions themselves, but instead either mentioned it 
in passing, or as an actor in a context where the story did not relate to the EU itself. For 
example, the conflict in Ukraine is very prevalent in the database and many of these cases 
mention the EU, but these were not included unless the stories claimed that the EU’s actions 
during the conflict said something about the EU itself. 
In the database, the disinformation cases are always presented with a title, followed by a 
summary of the original disinformation article, and then a “disproof” section which presents 
counterarguments to the story. The disinformation cases are presented as short summaries (in 
many cases only a few sentences long) of the original articles and are written by the staff of 
EUvsDisinfo. One important issue that comes up in analyzing the disinformation cases is that it 
is difficult to tell how accurate these summaries are without understanding the language of the 
original text, which are mostly in Russian. As was discussed above, the research of Hutchings 
and Tolz (2020), which compared these summaries to the originals, found that they are often 
not an accurate depiction of the original piece. However, for the purposes of this analysis, this 
should not present an issue, as the content of the original pieces is not relevant, as the focus is 
on which kinds of arguments EUvsDisinfo classifies as disinformation and how it claims to 
disprove them. Therefore, the summaries presented of the disinformation cases, whether 
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accurate or not, are an important source of information about which kinds of themes and 
arguments EUvsDisinfo sees as threatening to the image of the EU. 
Before moving onto the specifics of the analysis, a few general observations about this 
database should be discussed. As has been pointed out by previous research on EUvsDisinfo as 
well, more often than not, what EUvsDisinfo calls debunking disinformation consists of little 
more than dismissing arguments as “recurring pro-Kremlin narratives” or conspiracy theories. 
While the following section of the analysis will focus on the cases where at least some 
counterarguments were presented, it is important to note that it is very common for the 
disproof section to offer no counterargument, and instead simply link to a section of the 
database with a list of similar disinformation cases, as proof that the disinformation is prevalent 
and belongs to a wider narrative. The idea seems to be that the fact that many similar stories 
are circulating in Russian media serves as evidence to disprove the claim; this point came up 
also in the analysis done by Hutchings and Tolz.  
In the following chapter, the analyzed publications will be divided into categories based on 
interrelated themes that emerged from the analysis. These are arguments related to 1.) 
democracy in the EU, 2.) sovereignty and 3.) unity and EU integration. These themes are clearly 
interrelated and often overlap, but they are separated into these sections in the interest of 
clarity of the analysis. The main findings are summarized in Table 1, which shows the main 
disinformation ‘themes’ that emerge from the flagged disinformation cases, as well as reasons 
given for why they are considered disinformation. This is important because disinformation, by 
definition, is seen to differ from false information in general because it serves a particular, 
political purpose. The table also shows the narratives with which the disinformation stories are 
‘debunked’, and the evidence given for these counterarguments.  
While the term disinformation is problematic, as was discussed above, for the sake of clarity of 
the analysis, the ‘disinformation cases’ published on EUvsDisinfo will be called by that term, as 
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Table 1: Main disinformation narratives and counterarguments 
 
 
4.1. Democracy in the EU 
 
Until about February 2020, when the Covid-19 epidemic broke out and began to dominate the 
news cycle, the democratic qualifications of the EU was the most common theme in the 
dataset. Cases in this category contain disinformation stories making claims about the anti-
democratic nature of the EU. They can be divided roughly into three subsections; stories 
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focusing on the role and power of different EU institutions; stories focusing on the domination 
of financial capital and lobbyists in the EU; and freedom of speech in the EU.  
In the first subsection, the disinformation cases usually consist of arguments that the 
Commission dominates EU decision-making, that the European parliament is weak, and that 
policy-making in the EU generally lacks transparency and is a tool for larger states to implement 
their own visions at the European level. In response to accusations of an undemocratic EU, the 
response is usually to summarize the commitment of the EU to representative democracy. The 
rebuttals typically begin by claiming that the story is part of a pro-Kremlin narrative 
“questioning the EU institutions’ legitimacy and powers”2, with links to similar stories published 
on the website. The rebuttals then go on to summarize some of the main features of European 
elections and provide a short explanation about the role of the EP and how its powers have 
evolved over the history of the Union. It is often emphasized that the EP is equal in terms of 
decision-making power with the Council, which is presented as proof that the system is 
representative.  
The fact that the act of questioning the EU’s legitimacy and powers is considered disinformation 
stands out here. To anyone familiar with EU studies, the above claims will seem quite 
commonplace; they are all a part of ongoing, contested debates. Particularly power structures 
in the EU are the topic of constant discussion, debate and criticism. Regardless of what position 
one takes on these issues, it is troubling that according to EUvsDisinfo, these arguments are 
disinformation and advance pro-Kremlin narratives.  
The claims about the EP being powerless relate very closely to general concerns about 
information war, according to which the main aim of Russian disinformation is to discourage 
people from voting and to lower their trust in democratic institutions. The proliferation of these 
ideas is seen as dangerous, as was explained in the earlier sections on hybrid threats. It is 
therefore no surprise that this would be one of the largest categories of EU-related cases on 
EUvsDisinfo. However, given that the Commission has stated that disinformation is best 
combated by increasing transparency of the sources of information, promoting diversity of 
 
2 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-elections-are-a-sham/  
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information and enabling “citizens to make informed decisions based on critical thinking”, 
ensuring the credibility and quality of information, and “inclusive solutions” that include a 
broad range of stakeholders in society (European Commission 2018a p. 2), the methods of 
EUvsDisinfo seem questionable. They do not engage in critical debate or acknowledge any 
legitimate debate behind the claims, but instead dismiss them as pro-Kremlin and anti-EU, 
giving the impression that there is no room for debate about these topics. If the questioning of 
the legitimacy of the EU’s institutions is considered disinformation, this brings up the obvious 
question of, how could the EU’s democratic credentials be criticized in a way that would not be 
considered to be playing into the Kremlin’s hands? 
In the category of domination of financial capital, the flagged stories typically argue that the 
financial elite and industry lobbyists rule the EU, and that decision-making favors their interests 
over those of the general public. These cases are actually quite rare in the database which was 
a surprising finding given that it is quite a common criticism of the EU. 
One recent case claimed that “Europeans see the EU merely as a great market”, and that the EU 
is “based on neoliberal theories that posit the primacy of economics over politics, and the 
domination of financial capital. 3” This ideology was claimed to ultimately aim at destroying 
nation-states. Besides the common “recurring pro-Kremlin narrative” claim, the disproof 
section goes on to summarize the history of the creation of the EU, highlighting the need to 
avoid conflict after the Second World War. According to the narrative, from what “began as a 
merely economic union”, it expanded to encompass many policy-areas. The issue of the 
primacy of the economy over politics, a criticism very often leveled at the EU, is not addressed 
in itself. The disproof section goes onto simply state that “despite the various internal and 
external challenges to the EU in the past years, the European sense of togetherness does not 
seem to have weakened”, citing a recent Eurobarometer poll.  
This case brings up a problem that is very common with the disinformation cases; they often do 






EU’s main achievements, or tell the story of its founding. Eurobarometer surveys are also often 
cited as evidence that the majority of Europeans have a positive view of the EU, or that support 
for the EU is at a historical high, and that therefore, these different kinds of criticisms are 
untrue. 
The actual issue of the dominance of financial capital is usually simply dismissed as a pro-
Kremlin narrative and a conspiracy theory. To give another example, one case claimed that the 
EU was a “servant of the financial elites4”, which is similarly debunked by labeling it a 
conspiracy theory, yet the concerns about lobbying are not even brought up. Instead, the 
counterevidence given is simply a statement that there is no “secretive financial elite” ruling 
the EU and that the EU is based on “the principle of representative democracy”. But there is no 
claim of any secrecy mentioned in the disinformation case summary, so framing the disproof in 
this way implies the idea that the EU is subservient to financial interest is simply unreasonable 
or irrational. Again, the question is about a highly contested and political issue, but instead of 
engaging in this debate or presenting counterarguments directly related to the claim, the 
strategy seems to be to ridicule any such claims. As with the issue of the representativeness of 
EU institutions, the role of financial interests is another issue that is the topic of much academic 
as well as public debate. Social movements within the EU have mobilized around the issue of 
the power of the financial elite in the EU, and the dominance of neoliberal economic theory in 
the EU is a very common criticism. Yet EUvsDisinfo seems to discredit all such work and 
criticism as simply anti-EU (and pro-Kremlin). 
Where there is a rebuttal, this typically consists of a short summary of the EU’s main 
institutions and a statement that lobbying in the EU is regulated, citing the EU Transparency 
Register and the Code of Conduct for lobbying. The issue of what kind of power lobbyists hold 
in the EU and how lobbying may affect decision-making is not engaged with in any of the 
analyzed cases. For example, one case claimed that power is held by industry lobbyists who do 
not “identify with” Europeans, and that the EU is “about the abolition of rights to social 
security, employment protection and dismissal protection fought for by the labor movement.5” 
 
4 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-is-a-servant-of-financial-elites/ 
5 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-lobbyists-are-real-rulers-of-the-eu/  
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The rebuttal states that this is a conspiracy theory and that the Code of Conduct “establishes 
the underlying principles for standards of behavior in all relations with the EU institutions.” No 
reference is made to the argument about social security rights, an argument which has been 
prevalent in public discussions about the EU particularly in the aftermath of the euro crisis. 
Issues related to the euro are not commonly published on EUvsDisinfo, but one particularly 
interesting case was featured on the site. The summary of the disinformation story said only 
the following:  
“When Southern European countries adopted the Euro as unified currency instead of their 
own currency, they lost the most important banking tool that could help them achieve 
constant economic growth and help overcome economic crises they might face. 6”  
This was labled as a common pro-Kremlin narrative used to discredit the EU, part of narratives 
that claim that “the Euro is responsible for the economic downfall of ‘Southern’ European 
countries” The disproof refers to the GDP growth of the Eurozone and to an IMF report that 
found that the “real reasons” for the economic problems of Southern member states had 
nothing to do with the euro (it is not said what they did have to do with). Again, a complex 
debate, about the effects of the euro on diverse national economies, is not engaged with at all 
and the criticism is brushed off as if it were a case of an easily verifiable fact. 
Finally, in this category, the issue of freedom of speech in the EU comes up very often, 
especially in relation to responses to disinformation. The disinformation cases relating to 
disinformation itself often either deny that any campaigns are happening or claim that the 
responses taken by the EU constitute an assault on free speech. One case commented on the 
Commission’s actions against disinformation, which were claimed to mean “censoring and 
telling what is true and what is not7”. Codes of conduct agreed on with flatforms such as 
Facebook were presented in the disinformation cases as a war on free speech and an assault on 
democracy. They also commonly claim that warnings about Russian disinformation campaigns 
are a way to distract from the EU’s internal problems.  The disproof typically claims that the 
 
6 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/southern-european-countries-were-afflicted-by-adopting-the-euro/  
7 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/rep ort/the-european-commission-wants-to-certify-true-information/  
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Code of Practice on Disinformation includes an aim to facilitate the discovery and access to new 
sources of information, including “alternative viewpoints.” It is also often stated that the EU or 





Another very common topic in the Disinformation Database is the issue of the sovereignty of EU 
nations. This includes arguments about both the loss of sovereignty due to the dominance of 
EU decision-making over domestic politics, as well as the loss of sovereignty due to the 
influence of the US and NATO over EU member states. 
Again, what stands out most is how little information is given as ‘disproof’ to the disinformation 
claims. For example, on the topic of national governments vs. EU-level decision-making, one 
disinformation piece stated:  
“Treaties signed over the past 20 years by European countries have deprived national 
parliaments of their sovereignty, which no longer have the economic, financial or 
military leverage to take autonomous decisions in their own interests.8” 
The disproof presented is simply: “Recurring pro-Kremlin narrative claiming that EU member 
states lose their sovereignty to the EU, consistent with another narrative about undemocratic 
EU.” In other similar cases, Article 4 of the Treaty of the European Union is summarized, stating 
that this binds the EU to respect the sovereignty and national identities of its member states. 
Article 5 is also often cited, which is said to ensure “the principle of subsidiarity, which 
guarantees that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen.9” Rather than having 
lost any sovereignty, EU member states have decided to “pool some of their ‘sovereignty’ in 
 
8 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-countries-have-lost-their-sovereignty-through-the-european-treaties/ 
9 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-commission-is-highly-undemocratic/  
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areas where it makes sense to work together.10” None of the cases analyzed go into the debate 
about the effect of EU legislation on national legislatures or sovereignty in general, which is also 
the subject of considerable public and academic debate. 
Most sovereignty-related arguments, however, relate to NATO or the influence of the US. 
Stories that claim that the EU is controlled, or at least heavily influenced by the US are very 
common in the Disinformation Database. Typically, they also accuse NATO of militarization and 
the escalation of conflicts. They are most commonly brushed off as pro-Kremlin narratives and 
accused of attempting to undermine NATO’s image. The partnership between NATO and the EU 
is presented as equal and of importance, with emphasis on the fact that EU is not controlled by 
NATO. Some cases claim that the EU is losing confidence in NATO; the disproof claims that on 
the contrary, the EU is significantly expanding its mutual support with NATO, and evolving the 
areas of cooperation between the two. Also any claims of NATO being an instrument of US 
foreign policy are countered by stating that its member states are sovereign countries and all 
decisions are taken by consensus, so it would not be possible for it to be a foreign policy 
instrument. 
Besides defending the EU against accusations of being controlled by NATO, it is interesting to 
note how much of EUvsDisinfo tells positive stories about NATO. Many NATO-related 
disinformation stories in the database claim that NATO’s security policy is aggressive and that 
the focus is on security rather than peace, and the disproof sections defend NATO against these 
accusations11. Rather than provoking Russia or encircling it as many of the flagged articles state, 
the disproof sections state that NATO actions are only defensive. The idea that NATO could be a 
threat to Russia is clearly identified as disinformation and part of a pro-Kremlin narrative of a 
peaceful Russia and an aggressive NATO.  
One NATO-related story claimed that the “realist theory of international relations dominating 
the USA assumes that the national interest of the state is superior to the international law and 
 
10 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-an-undemocratic-neocolonial-project/  




treaties signed with its allies12”, and that therefore, Article 5 of NATO would only be fulfilled 
when it was in the self-interest of the US. This is declared to be a recurring pro-Kremlin 
narrative about NATO and the US, with the disproof explaining that Article 5 is critical for NATO, 
and that since the Second World war, “the US troops based in Europe guaranteed the security 
of its European allies”. Increasing US military presence in Europe is because of two main 
threats: Russia’s influence and international terrorism. But never is the realist theory about 
states maximizing their self-interest addressed, or the argument that the US would only protect 
Europe where it served its own interest (this ‘self-interest’ could even be defined in many very 
different ways). 
A common theme in the database is also that the EU is losing confidence in the US or NATO. 
One case claimed, in its totality: 
“Europeans always aligned with America and didn’t take independent decisions. But after 
Donald Trump came to power, it happened so that the Americans left Europe unhappy and 
to its own fate, and Germany had to solve important issues on its own13.”  
This was rebutted by repeating that member states are sovereign and make their own policy 
decisions, and that while the US is an important ally, it does not control the EU.  
Even cases that cite US pressure or influence, rather than control, are dismissed as conspiracy 
theories, grouped together with the stories that claim the EU is a US puppet. Stories in the 
database claiming that the EU is dominated by the US often make claims about the EU being 
militarily and politically dependent on the US. Especially sanctions also presented as the EU 
simply following actions dictated by the US. Typically these arguments are rebutted by claiming 
that “the US is an important ally to the EU but EU policy is not determined by the US.”14 This is 
the response even to cases where the claim is about heavy influence, not control. They often 
 
12 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-usa-will-fulfill-natos-article-5-only-if-it-is-required-by-its-national-interests/ 
13 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/lined-up-with-the-us-the-eu-never-took-independent-decisions/  
14 For example, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-usa-persistently-impose-to-europe-a-confrontation-with-russia/ 
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refer to “sovereign decisions”15 but it is not explained what exactly this means, and what effect 
‘influence’ may have on sovereignty. 
In this category also, counterarguments often do not respond to the claim made in the 
disinformation story. For example, to one case claiming that “the EU is a servant of US 
geopolitics”, the disproof was that the “EU is in a prime position, when it comes to trade, as the 
EU is the largest economy in the world16”, and citing high GDP, economic growth, commitment 
to free trade etc.  
 
4.3. Unity and EU integration 
 
While the stories about EU democracy were the most common in the database before February 
2020, after that, the unity and integration of the EU became the most common theme in the 
database, as COVID-19 news started to dominate on EUvsDisinfo, too. This category includes 
cases that claim that different internal problems are evidence that EU member states lack 
solidarity with each other, or even that the Union is at the point of disintegrating. Before the 
pandemic, these stories mostly related to Brexit. Stories about internal problems have been 
particularly prevalent since the start of the pandemic, with numerous cases being published 
that claim that the EU’s crisis response showed disunity or member states’ concern with self-
interest. 
What is interesting with these cases is that the disinformation stories are often predictions; 
different problems with the EU are claimed to lead to its disintegration. A very common 
argument in the database is that Brexit would cause a domino effect of member states leaving 
the EU. For example, one story claimed that Brexit would be a “dangerous precedent” and the 
Brexit story would be unfavorable for the EU. The story claimed that “[c]ertain Western 
 





experts, political analysts predict the imminent collapse of the European Union. 17” This story 
does not even claim that there definitely will be a collapse, but simply that certain experts say 
so. Yet it was labeled as pro-Kremlin disinformation about the EU’s collapse. Eurobarometer 
polls showing “historically high levels” of support for the EU are cited as disproof of the claim, 
as well as statements of EU leaders respecting Britain’s decision to leave. There is no 
acknowledgement of the fact that the possible future disintegration of the EU was being 
speculated at the time, whether or not these speculations were credible. This case shows how 
even quite ‘mild’ cases of negative views of the EU get labeled disinformation on EUvsDisinfo.  
In this category, too, it is common that the disproof sections do not actually respond to a 
particular argument in the disinformation story, but just present those statements as pro-
Kremlin, and then cite opionion polls from different member states showing high approval rates 
for the EU. This is especially prevalent with cases that portray Brexit as a sign of general 
dissatisfaction with the EU. Responses to these stories claim each time that the EU is actually 
very popular among the European public; not one mentions issues such as the rise in 
Eurosceptic parties and movements, or even the existence of any public discussion that is 
critical of the EU. The main argument here seems to be that since polls have found that the 
majority wants to stay in the EU, any claims about disintegration are disinformation. In fact, the 
narrative seems to imply that none of these problems related to lack of solidarity or unity exist 
at all.  
The use of these opinion polls as evidence of popularity of the EU is also problematic because 
when opinion polls are cited in the flagged disinformation cases, these are considered 
unreliable, misleading evidence. For example, one disinformation case claimed that the idea of 
holding a referendum on leaving the EU is gaining popularity in other member states, too, citing 
a poll that showed interest in a referendum in different member states. This was labeled 
disinformation because the outlet, Sputnik, had carried out the poll themselves from only 5,019 
people. Interestingly, the disproof also cited a poll that on the contrary found significant 





Another issue that stands out in its absence is the rise of Eurosceptic as well as anti-immigration 
movements within the EU. One disinformation story claims that the EU has failed and that 
“liberalism is in crisis18”, partly due to globalization and “the negative reactions of society to 
multiculturalism and immigration.” The counterargument is that no evidence was given for the 
claim, and again the Eurobarometer is cited to show that European unity has not weakened 
despite the challenges of the past years. There is also a link to the “EU’s main achievements.” 
Presumably, with the point about opposition to globalization and negative reactions to 
multiculturalism and immigration, the original story was pointing to the rise of the extreme 
right in Europe, yet this phenomena, which seems quite obviously related, is not addressed at 
all in the disproof. In fact, despite many of these disinformation stories referencing polarizing 
content about immigration and multiculturalism, the rise of the far-right is only mentioned in 
one of the cases in the dataset.   
One disinformation piece claimed that December 2019 had been “rough on the EU19”, as 
protests had “consumed” many of its member states. The disproof stated that this was “an 
exaggeration and a sensationalist narrative” which sought to exaggerate tensions. This was 
labeled as disinformation because it was sensationalist and exaggerating. This ‘disproof’ is very 
problematic because if an article can be labeled as disinformation due to sensationalist content, 
then the line between disinformation and regular, sensationalist media content is left very 
unclear. 
Many disinformation cases also relate to defining the shared values of the EU. Many of them 
include arguments about a ‘moral decay’ of Europe, commonly referring to consumerism, the 
decline of family values, lack of respect for national identities and cultures, etc. The disproof 
given usually cite different declarations or the Treaty of the European Union and the positive 
values associated with it, such as respect for human rights, pluralism, freedom and democracy, 
with an emphasis on them being common to all Member States.  
 
18 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-has-failed/ 
19 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/map-shows-eu-on-fire/  
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Since the COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a steep rise in stories in the database claiming 
that the epidemic  revealed many weaknesses of the EU and its unity, namely lack of solidarity, 
as well as leadership. The delay in the reaction to the epidemic is presented in these cases as 
evidence of the inefficiency of a the EU bureaucracy. Member states are claimed to have been 
left alone to deal with the crisis. Especially border policies presented as evidence of 
disintegration and that ultimately, the responsibility for dealing with the crisis is on national 
governments rather than the EU. 
According to EUvsDisinfo, the pandemic is being exploited for a narrative which aims to “pit EU 
member states against each other in an attempt to undermine European solidarity.20” Again, 
the responses to the claims made often repeat lists of the EU’s achievements and actions in the 
crisis. Unlike in the earlier cases, in this section there is an acknowledgement for at least some 
room for criticism; it is conceded that the “COVID-19 outbreak constituted a serious challenge 
to Europe’s readiness for a crisis”, and that the Commission has “apologized for the slow 
response.” However, overall, the argument is that the EU actually showed strength and 
readiness to deal with a crisis, with allegations to the contrary flagged as disinformaiton. 
In this category, the disproof sections tend to go into considerably more detail than in previous 
cases; the rebuttals often not only include links to websites with information about the actions 
taken but also more detailed explanations. However, what is considered to be disinformation is 
just as problematic as in earlier cases. For example, one disinformation case simply stated: “The 
unity of Europe was dealt a serious blow by the COVID-19 epidemic. The European Union has 
been unable to support even its most affected countries, such as Italy.21” This is clearly a claim 
that can be argued from different sides, based on perspective, yet is presented as simply a 
matter of ‘true vs. false’ information. Rebuttals to stories claiming that the crisis has revealed 
the inefficiency or lack of utility of the EU argue that on the contrary, the crisis has shown “how 
indispensable Schengen is to the European economy and way of life22” – which, again, is 
another perspective to the issue, rather than ‘disproof’ to an incorrect statement.  
 
20 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/it-is-the-end-of-the-european-union-because-of-coronavirus/  
21 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-has-been-unable-to-support-its-most-affected-members/  
2222 For example, https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-main-root-of-the-eu-was-blown-out-during-the-coronavirus/  
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Many stories are labeled disinformation simply because of negative adjectives used to describe 
characteristics of the EU. One story, for example, claimed that the pandemic has put EU’s 
existence into question, and has made its institutions look “pathetic and helpless23”. It was 
labeled disinformation because of exaggerated claims about “the inefficient governance in the 
EU, without providing any facts to these claims.” Again, there are also many cases where 
predictions are labeled disinformation, such as claims that the pandemic will lead, or may lead, 
to the disintegration of the EU or to a rise in nationalism, etc. These are equally labeled as 
disinformation whether they claim that something is likely to happen or that it will happen. 
 
5. Conclusions and Discussion  
 
Much of EUvsDisinfo’s work seems to be about collecting what are considered misleading, 
negative stories about the EU and declaring them to be a part of a recurring pro-Kremlin 
narrative that is intended to undermine the EU. Recently the project has been more upfront 
about this, as its practices have been changing since being met with criticism. For example, the 
sources of the flagged disinformation stories are no longer labeled ‘disinformation outlets’. The 
website also now has a disclaimer which refers to the publications of the website as 
information and opinions, which is a change from the earlier presentation of its work as 
something similar to fact-checking, correcting false claims. However, despite this disclaimer, the 
content of the actual publications in the disinformation database has not changed. 
At least in the case of disinformation stories relating to the EU itself, this is problematic given 
that these stories rarely deals with the type of facts that could be corrected in any objective 
way; rather, it is concerned with narratives. On the one hand, this goal is not denied or hidden 
as it is clearly stated that the East StratCom Task Force is tasked with strategic narratives, which 
includes presenting a positive image. On the other hand, the EEAS claims that the project is 
about exposing disinformation, and the strategic narrative aspect of promoting positive 
 
23 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-coronavirus-puts-eus-existence-into-question/  
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narratives about the EU is not explicit on the website. While the work of EUvsDisinfo could be 
seen as an attempt to rectify what it considers misleading narratives about the EU by 
presenting another point of view to them, this is not actually what the project claims to be 
doing, as it has been claimed that it is only about exposing disinformation and raising 
awareness of it (EEAS 2018). 
EUvsDisinfo collects stories that criticize the EU or present it in a negative light and ‘disproves’ 
them with positive stories that emphasize the EU’s democratic credentials and the unity among 
its member states. Many of the arguments flagged as disinformation are common criticisms of 
the EU, but they are labeled as disinformation due to their consistency with other ‘pro-Kremlin’ 
disinformation narratives. The project declares arguments related to contested and very 
political issues as disinformation without engaging in the debate, in quite a simple ‘true vs. 
false’ approach. A few of the cases analyzed here did include correcting more simple issues like 
cases that misquote claims made by EU leaders, where EUvsDisinfo links to the speech and 
shows that this is not what was said or points to how the interpretation of it was 
misrepresented. In these cases, the approach is more appropriate, because the claims can be 
checked against clearly corresponding facts. However, these cases are a very small minority in 
the dataset, and most cases are about wider narratives which arguably cannot be so easily 
proven true or false.   
Particularly in the context of claims about disinformation as a form of hybrid warfare, this is 
very problematic because the implication is that particular viewpoints and opinions advance 
the interests of a hostile actor. As was discussed earlier, the information warfare narrative 
often involves a claim that even domestic actors, whether consciously or not, participate in the 
conflict by expressing viewpoints ‘planted’ by an external actor (e.g. Jantunen 2015, Nye 2018). 
EUvsDisinfo presents negative views about the EU as being products of such efforts to 
manipulate public opinion. These arguments are presented as part of campaigns to discredit 
the EU, which also implies that they could not form part of legitimate discussion and criticism of 
complex issues. Therefore, the concerns that have been raised with regard to the securitizing 
aspects of the ‘information war’ debate are very relevant to the publications of EUvsDisinfo.  
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EU sources claim that Russian disinformation portrays a one-sided view of issues and frames 
them in the interest of the Kremlin. It is hard to make the case that something similar is not 
being done here – disinformation stories are ‘disproven’ by giving an account of the same 
events or issues that presents the EU in a positive way, without acknowledging that there may 
be lack of consensus on these issues. Even very common criticisms related to EU democracy, 
sovereignty of member states and the EU’s internal problems are grouped together with more 
‘outrageous’ narratives, giving the impression that articulating these kinds of criticisms 
advances the goals of the Kremlin. The project presents some very common criticisms of the EU 
as a form of participation in Russian disinformation campaigns. In this sense, EUvsDisinfo could 
be seen as the kind of project that postmodern writers have pointed to, in which the concept of 
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58. 22.3.2020: DISINFO: THE EU HAS NOT PROVIDED ANY GUIDANCE TO MEMBER STATES AMID THE 
COVID-19 CRISIS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-has-not-provided-any-guidance-to-
member-states-amid-the-covid-19-crisis/ Issue 190 
59. 19.3.2020: DISINFO: CORONAVIRUS IS A NAIL IN THE COFFIN OF THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-failed-to-respond-to-the-coronavirus-outbreak/ Issue 189 
60. 16.3.2020: DISINFO: EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY DOES NOT EXIST 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-solidarity-does-not-exist/ Issue 191 
61. 16.3.2020: DISINFO: COVID-19 PROVES THE EU IS COLLAPSING 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/covid-19-shows-the-eu-is-collapsing/ Issue 190 
62. 13.3.2020: DISINFO: THE CORONAVIRUS PUTS EU’S EXISTENCE INTO QUESTION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-coronavirus-puts-eus-existence-into-question/ Issue 188 
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63. 11.3.2020: DISINFO: THE EU IS A WARRING PARTY IN THE WAR IN UKRAINE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-a-warring-party-in-the-war-in-ukraine/ Issue 189 
64. 12.2.2020: DISINFO: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ARE UNDER HEAVY US CONTROL 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-countries-are-under-the-us-heavy-control/ Issue 185 
65. 6.2.2020: DISINFO: EUROPEAN UNION IS MERELY A MARKET, AIMED TO DESTROY NATION-
STATES AND ABANDON EUROPEAN VALUES. https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-
is-merely-a-market-aims-to-destroy-nation-states-and-has-abandoned-genuine-european-
values/  Issue 183 
66. 6.2.2020: DISINFO: THE EU PRACTISES CENSORSHIP AND WAR PROPAGANDA AGAINST RUSSIA. 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-practises-censorship-and-war-propaganda-against-russia/ 
Issue 183 
67. 28.1.2019: DISINFO: EU AND NATO VIEW CHRISTIANITY AS A FORCE THAT NEEDS TO BE 
OVERCOME https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-and-nato-view-christianity-as-a-force-that-needs-
to-be-overcome/ Issue 179 
68. 21.1.2020: DISINFO: EUROPEAN UNION JUSTIFIES NAZISM 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-justifies-nazism/ Issue 183 
69. 17.1.2020: DISINFO: THE EU IS AN OCCUPATIONAL GOVERNMENT ON BEHALF OF THE US IN 
EUROPE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-occupation-government-behalf-us-in-europe/ Issue 
180 
70. 14.1.2020: DISINFO: LINED UP WITH THE US, THE EU NEVER TOOK INDEPENDENT DECISIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/lined-up-with-the-us-the-eu-never-took-independent-decisions/  
Issue 181 
71. 27.12.2019: DISINFO: WESTERN SOCIETIES DOMINATED BY CHILDISH AND STUPID PEOPLE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/western-societies-are-increasingly-dominated-by-childish-and-
stupid-people-and-are-hostile-to-values-such-as-courage-loyalty-and-ardor/ Issue 179 
72. 17.12.2019: DISINFO: FEMINIST AND GENDER THEORIES USED BY THE WEST TO UNDERMINE 
COUNTRIES BASED ON TRADITIONAL PATRIARCHAL VALUES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/feminist-and-gender-theories-are-used-by-the-west-to-
undermine-the-cultures-and-the-governments-of-countries-based-on-traditional-patriarchal-
values/ Issue 178 
73. 15.12.2019: DISINFO: ELITES PROMOTE MIGRATION TO EUROPE TO PREVENT AN ALLIANCE 
BETWEEN RIGHT-WING AND LEFT-WING POPULISM https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/liberal-
globalist-elites-promote-migration-flows-into-europe-in-order-to-prevent-an-alliance-between-
right-wing-populism-and-left-wing-populism/ Issue 177 
74. 12.12.2019: DISINFO: NEW YEAR FIREWORKS CANCELLED BECAUSE OF MIGRANTS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/new-year-fireworks-were-cancelled-because-of-migrants/ Issue 
178 
75. 9.12.2019: DISINFO: THE NEW EU “MAGNITSKY SANCTIONS” ARE A WAY TO DISTRACT 
EUROPEANS FROM THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/magnitsky-
sanctions-are-a-project-to-legitimise-the-eus-right-to-intervene-in-other-states/ Issue 177 
76. 3.12.2019: DISINFO: ACCORDING TO EXPERTS, THE EU RISKS LOSING HUNGARY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/pending-check-the-eu-risks-losing-hungary/ Issue 178 
77. 2.12.2019: DISINFO: EUROPE IS LOSING ITS VALUES AND FORMER POWER 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-losing-its-values-and-former-power/ Issue 176 
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78. 27.11.2019: DISINFO: THE EU WILL SPLIT-UP BY 2028https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/putin-
predicted-the-split-up-of-eu-until-2028/ Issue 176 
79. 22.11.2019: DISINFO: THE USA WILL FULFIL NATO’S ARTICLE 5 ONLY IF IT IS REQUIRED BY ITS 
NATIONAL INTERESTS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-usa-will-fulfill-natos-article-5-only-if-it-
is-required-by-its-national-interests/ Issue 174 
80. 14.11.2019: DISINFO: THE EU’S IMPERIALISM PROMOTES MIGRATION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russia-has-never-been-empire-eus-imperialism-promotes-
migration/ Issue 173 
81. 10.11.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS FAILED 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-has-failed/ Issue 172 
82. 8.11.2019: DISINFO: MACRON IS A MOUTHPIECE OF THE ROTHSCHILDS, WHEREAS EUROPE IS A 
PUPPET OF THE US AND VATICAN https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/macron-is-a-mouthpiece-of-the-
rothschilds-whereas-europe-is-a-puppet-of-the-us-and-vatican/ Issue 172 
83. 6.11.2019: DISINFO: THE US CONSIDERS THE EU AS A KIND OF PROTECTORATE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-us-considers-the-eu-as-a-kind-of-protectorate/ Issue 173 
84. 3.11.2019: DISINFO: AFTER BREXIT, THE EU WILL DO ITS UTMOST TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE 
BREAKUP OF GREAT BRITAIN https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/after-brexit-the-eu-will-do-its-
utmost-to-contribute-to-the-breakup-of-great-britain/ Issue 171 
85. 31.10.2019: DISINFO: NATO TRIES TO ACHIEVE SECURITY THROUGH VERY AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nato-tries-to-achieve-security-with-very-aggressive-actions/ Issue 
171 
86. 21.10.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS ROTTEN AND COUNTRIES ARE LEAVING IT 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-rotten-and-countries-are-leaving-it/ Issue 170 
87. 21.10.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS A SERVANT OF US GEOPOLITICS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/pending-check-the-eu-is-servant-of-us-geopolitics-and-nobody-
takes-the-eu-seriously/ Issue 171 
88. 21.10.2019: DISINFO: THE EU CONDEMNS DEATH PENALTY IN BELARUS BUT DOES NOT DO SO IN 
RELATION TO THE US OR JAPAN https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-condemns-the-death-
penalty-in-belarus-but-does-not-so-in-relation-to-the-us-or-japan/ Issue 171 
89. 19.10.2019: DISINFO: THE WEST WAGES INFORMATION WAR AGAINST RUSSIA 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-west-wage-informational-war-against-russia/ Issue 170 
90. 18.10.2019: DISINFO: BY SUPPORTING EUROMAIDAN, THE EU PROMOTED SIMILAR PROTESTS IN 
THE EU https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/by-supporting-ukrainian-euromaidan-the-eu-fell-in-its-
own-trap-and-now-crumbling-because-of-catalonia/ Issue 169 
91. 17.10.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE LOST THEIR SOVEREIGNTY THROUGH THE 
EUROPEAN TREATIES https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-countries-have-lost-their-
sovereignty-through-the-european-treaties/ Issue 169 
92. 13.10.2019: DISINFO: EU IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA DUE TO US PRESSURE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-imposes-sanctions-against-russia-due-to-us-pressure/ Issue 168 
93. 13.10.2019: DISINFO: NATO IS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY AND POSES A THREAT TO 
RUSSIA https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nato-an-instrument-of-us-foreign-policy-and-it-poses-a-
threat-to-russia/ Issue 169 
94. 10.10.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN COMMISSION DID NOT DETECT SIGNS OF A DISINFORMATION 





95. 7.10.2019: DISINFO: ALL NATO COUNTRIES ARE SUBORDINATE TO THE US 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/all-nato-countries-are-subordinated-to-the-u-s-the-west-has-no-
partnership-culture/ Issue 168 
96. 26.9.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IGNORES RUSSIA’S EFFORTS TO RECONCILE AN EQUAL DIALOGUE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-ignores-russias-efforts-to-reconcile-an-equal-dialogue/ Issue 
166 
97. 24.9.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT REPRESENTS THIRD REICH 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliament-represents-third-reich/ Issue 166 
98. 23.9.2019: DISINFO: THE EP ALLOWS THE DESTRUCTION OF MONUMENTS TO THE FIGHTERS 
AGAINST FASCISM https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliament-allows-the-
destruction-of-monuments-to-the-fighters-against-fascism/ Issue 165 
99. 23.9.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS TRYING TO BREAK OUT OF WASHINGTON’S CONTROL AND 
OCCUPATION https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-trying-to-break-out-of-washingtons-power-
the-occupation-takes-occurs-without-war-and-without-resistance/ Issue 166 
100. 23.9.2019: DISINFO: THE US IS OCCUPYING THE EU; THE BALTIC COUNTRIES NEARLY LOST THEIR 
STATEHOOD https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-us-is-occupying-the-eu-the-baltic-countries-
nearly-lost-statehood/ Issue 166 
101. 20.9.2019: DISINFO: THE TASK OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY IS TO MAINTAIN NATO’S 
WAR AGAINST RUSSIA https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-task-of-the-european-defence-agency-
is-to-maintain-natos-war-against-russia/ Issue 165 
102. 19.9.2019: DISINFO: EU ARMY CAN BE SENT TO SUPPRESS NEW ‘BREXITS’ 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-army-can-be-sent-to-suppress-new-brexits/ Issue 165 
103. 18.9.2019: DISINFO: IN A STRONGER ALLIANCE WITH THE US, POLAND WANTS TO DICTATE ITS 
WILL TO THE REST OF THE EU https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/in-a-stronger-alliance-with-the-us-
poland-wants-dictate-its-will-to-the-rest-of-the-eu/ Issue 165 
104. 4.9.2019: DISINFO: THE US INTENDS TO “DISCIPLINE THE EU” FROM THE POSITION OF A SENIOR 
PARTNER https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-us-intends-to-discipline-the-eu-from-the-position-of-
a-senior-partner/ Issue 163 
105. 22.8.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS BUILT ON ANTI-EUROPEAN VALUES, RUSSIA IS REAL EUROPE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-built-on-anti-european-values-russia-is-real-europe/ 
Issue 162 
106. 22.8.2019: DISINFO: THE EU HAS TURNED INTO THE TOOL OF ASIANISATION, RUSSIA WILL 
PRESERVE OLD EUROPEAN HERITAGE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-has-turned-into-the-
tool-of-asianization-russia-will-preserve-old-european-heritage/ Issue 163 
107. 26.7.2019: DISINFO: LATVIA LOST ITS SOVEREIGNTY TO THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/latvia-has-lost-sovereignty-its-foreign-policy-is-dictated-by-
brussels-and-washington/  Issue 159 
108. 24.7.2019: DISINFO: VOTERS, THE EU PARLIAMENT AND NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ARE 
DISREGARDED BY EU COMMISSION https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/voters-the-eu-parliament-and-
national-parliaments-are-disregarded-by-eu-commission/ Issue 159 
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109. 19.7.2019: DISINFO: MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT USE RUSSOPHOBIA TO 
ADVANCE THEIR POLITICAL CAREERS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/members-of-the-european-
parliament-use-russophobia-to-advance-their-political-careers/ Issue 158 
110. 5.7.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS AN OLIGARCHIC ENTITY WHICH AIMS TO KEEP POST-SOVIET SPACE 
DISINTEGRATED https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-is-an-oligarchic-entity-which-
aims-to-keep-post-soviet-space-disintegrated/ Issue 159 
111. 27.6.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN UNION IS IN THE PROCESS OF DISINTEGRATION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-in-the-process-of-disintegration/ Issue 156 
112. 24.6.2019: DISINFO: DONALD TUSK IMPLEMENTS THE GERMAN VISION OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/donald-tusk-realizes-the-german-concept-of-the-european-
union/ Issue 160  
113. 18.6.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN UNION IS A SERVANT OF FINANCIAL ELITES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-is-a-servant-of-financial-elites/ Issue 155 
114. 17.6.2019: DISINFO: THE EU’S SOVEREIGNTY IN MILITARY AND POLITICAL SPHERES IS 
UNDERMINED BY THE US https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eus-sovereignty-in-military-and-
political-issues-is-undermined-by-the-us/ Issue 156 
115. 16.6.2019: DISINFO: POLAND HAS BEEN A VOCAL OPPONENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, AS 
COMMANDED BY THE US https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/poland-has-been-a-vocal-opponent-of-
the-european-union-as-commanded-by-the-us/ Issue 154 
116. 16.6.2019: DISINFO: EU SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA ARE NOT DEMOCRATIC 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-sanctions-against-russia-are-not-democratic/ Issue 154 
117. 14.6.2019: DISINFO: THE EU CONFIRMS THERE WAS NO FOREIGN DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN 
IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-confirms-there-was-no-
foreign-disinformation-campaign-in-the-european-elections/ Issue 156 
118. 14.6.2019: DISINFO: SOME COUNTRIES IN THE EU VOTE LIKE SHEEP 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/some-countries-in-the-eu-vote-without-their-own-opinion/ Issue 
156 
119. 13.6.2019: DISINFO: THE EU NO LONGER HAS CONFIDENCE IN THE US AND NATO 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-no-longer-has-confidence-in-the-us-and-nato/ Issue 157 
120. 4.6.2019: DISINFO: ITALY IS BEING PUNISHED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR 
SUPPORTING TRADITIONAL VALUES https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/italy-is-punished-by-the-
european-commission-for-supporting-traditional-values/ Issue 154 
121. 30.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLICY IS DETERMINED BY A GROUP OF 
RUSSOPHOBES CONTROLLED FROM THE US https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-foreign-
policy-is-determined-by-a-group-of-russophobes-controlled-from-the-us/ Issue 152 
122. 28.5.2019: DISINFO: EU EXPERTS: NO RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN THE ELECTIONS TO THE EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT 2019 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-experts-no-russian-meddling-in-the-
elections-to-the-european-parliament-2019/ Issue 152 
123. 24.5.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN UNION HAS NAZI ROOTS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-has-nazi-roots/ Issue 151 
124. 24.5.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN UNION WILL COLLAPSE SOON 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-union-will-collapse-soon/ Issue 152 
125. 23.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS A NEOCOLONIAL PROJECT https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-
is-an-undemocratic-neocolonial-project/ Issue 152 
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126. 23.5.2019: DISINFO: EU ELECTIONS ARE A SHAM https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-elections-are-
a-sham/ Issue 152 
127. 22.5.2019: DISINFO: NO PROOF OF RUSSIAN MEDDLING IN WESTERN ELECTIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/no-proof-of-russian-meddling-in-western-elections/ Issue 151 
128. 21.5.2019: DISINFO: ROMANIANS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/romanians-are-not-interested-in-european-elections/ Issue 153 
129. 19.5.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE FORBIDS DEPORTING OF ILLEGAL REFUGEES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-court-of-justice-forbids-deporting-of-illegal-refugees/ 
Issue 150 
130. 16.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION SUFFERS FROM RUSSOPHOBIA 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-commission-suffers-from-russophobia/ Issue 151 
131. 14.5.2019: DISINFO: EU’S POLITICAL AIM BEHIND THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME IS 
TO ISOLATE RUSSIA https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eus-political-aim-behind-the-eastern-
partnerhsip-is-to-isolate-russia/ Issue 150 
132. 12.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EU PORTRAYS ITSELF AS IDEOLOGICALLY “BETTER” THAN ITS MEMBER 
STATES https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-portrays-itself-as-ideologically-better-than-its-
member-states/ Issue 150 
133. 12.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HAS NO POWERS IN THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliament-has-no-power-in-the-eu/ Issue 150 
134. 12.5.2019: DISINFO: THE LOBBYISTS ARE REAL RULERS OF THE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-lobbyists-are-real-rulers-of-the-eu/ Issue 150 
135. 12.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EU IS A DEEPLY UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTRUCT 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-a-deeply-undemocratic-construct/ Issue 150 
136. 9.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DOES NOT HAVE REAL POWERS, EU 
BUREAUCRATS DECIDE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-parliament-does-not-have-real-
powers-eu-bureaucrats-decide/ Issue 149 
137. 7.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION IS ONE OF THE MOST UNDEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-commission-is-highly-undemocratic/ 
Issue 149 
138. 7.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT HAS NO EFFECT ON THE EU COMMISSION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliament-has-no-effect-on-the-eu-commission/ 
Issue 149 
139. 6.5.2019: DISINFO: THE EU CONTINUES THE AGGRESSIVE POLICIES OF NAZI GERMANY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-continues-aggressive-policies-of-nazi-germany/ Issue 151 
140. 1.5.2019: DISINFO: POLAND THREATENED BY THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, MAY LOSE ITS 
SOVEREIGNTY https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/poland-threatened-by-the-european-integration/ 
Issue 145 
141. 29.4.2019: DISINFO: THE EU WAS BORN IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE ATLANTICIST HEGEMONY 
OVER EUROPE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-was-born-in-order-to-preserve-the-
atlanticist-hegemony-on-europe/ Issue 149 
142. 24.4.2019: DISINFO: THE EU PARLIAMENT IS A PLACE OF CORRUPTION, VOTING IN THE 
ELECTIONS IS WORTHLESS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-parliament-is-a-place-of-corruption-
votes-for-this-parliament-are-worthless/ Issue 147 
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143. 22.4.2019: DISINFO: EUROPE HAS ACCEPTED AN IMMORAL, PERVERTED WAY OF LIFE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-accepted-immoral-perverted-way-of-life/ Issue 149 
144. 18.4.2019: DISINFO: EU LAWS THREATEN SOVEREIGNTY OF THE MEMBER STATES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-laws-threaten-sovereignty-of-member-states/ Issue 147 
145. 15.4.2019: DISINFO: EU INSTITUTIONS TAKE AWAY FREEDOM FROM THE EUROPEAN NATIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-institutions-take-away-freedom-from-the-european-nations/ 
Issue 146 
146. 6.4.2019: DISINFO: EU PRACTICES NEW METHODS OF COLONISATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-practices-new-methods-of-colonization-of-other-countries/ 
Issue 145 
147. 4.4.2019: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IS A FAÇADE STRUCTURE TO CORRUPT 
NATIONAL ELITES https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliament-is-a-facade-structure-
to-corrupt-national-elites/ Issue 145 
148. 2.4.2019: DISINFO: VOTING IN THE EP ELECTIONS WILL BRING NO BENEFITS TO THE LATVIAN 
PEOPLE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/voting-in-the-ep-elections-will-bring-no-benefits-to-the-
latvian-people/ Issue 143 
149. 1.4.2019: DISINFO: INTEGRATION WITH THE EU WOULD BRING A COMPLETE LOSS OF 
INDEPENDENCE TO BELARUS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/integration-with-the-eu-would-bring-
a-complese-loss-of-belarus-independece/ Issue 144 
150. 27.3.2019: DISINFO: THERE IS NO POINT IN VOTING IN THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN LATVIA 
BECAUSE NAZIS ARE ALREADY IN POWER https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/nazis-are-already-in-
power-in-latvia-there-is-no-sense-in-voting-in-future-elections/ Issue 143 
151. 16.3.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN ELITES DELIBERATELY SPREAD UNFOUNDED FEARS OF ALLEGED 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN UPCOMING MAY EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-elites-deliberately-spreading-unfounded-fears-of-
alleged-russian-interference-in-upcoming-may-european-elections/ Issue 141 
152. 14.3.2019: DISINFO: ALL STRATEGIC CHOICES OF FRANCE ARE DICTATED BY BRUSSELS, MACRON 
HAS NO POWER https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/all-strategic-choices-of-france-are-dictated-by-
brussels-macron-has-no-power/ Issue 141 
153. 11.3.2019: DISINFO: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECIDES PRACTICALLY NOTHING IN THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/european-parliament-decides-practically-nothing-in-the-eu/ Issue 
140 
154. 6.2.2019: DISINFO: A DYING EU PROMOTES AN ANTI-RUSSIAN, ANTI-DEMOCRATIC AGENDA 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/a-dying-eu-promotes-anti-russian-anti-democratic-agenda/ Issue 
136 
155. 24.1.2019: DISINFO: EUROPE IS OCCUPIED BY THE US AND HAS LIMITED SOVEREIGNTY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-occupied-by-the-us-and-has-limited-sovereignty/ Issue 
134 
156. 14.12.2018: DISINFO: MAP SHOWS: EU ON FIRE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/map-shows-eu-
on-fire/ Issue 130 
157. 10.12.2018: DISINFO: EUROPE IS BEING TURNED INTO A “CONCENTRATION CAMP” FOR 
MIGRANTS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-being-turned-into-a-concentration-camp-for-
migrants/ Issue 129 
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158. 5.12.2018: DISINFO: EU’S NEW ACTION PLAN AGAINST DISINFORMATION PROVIDES FOR 
STRENGTHENING SURVEILLANCE OF ONLINE PLATFORMS https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eus-new-
action-plan-provides-for-strengthening-surveillance-of-online-platforms/ Issue 129 
159. 3.12.2018: DISINFO: EU COUNTRIES ADOPTING SANCTIONS IN ORDER TO KEEP THE UNITY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-countries-adopting-sanctions-in-order-to-keep-the-unity/ Issue 
128 
160. 19.11.2018: DISINFO: MACRON URGED EU COUNTRIES TO ABANDON THEIR SOVEREIGNTY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/macron-urged-eu-countries-to-abandon-their-sovereignty/ Issue 
126 
161. 18.10.2018: DISINFO: THE POLITICAL ELITE OF THE EU IS FOLLOWING THE ORDERS FROM THE US 
WHEN IMPOSING SANCTIONS ON RUSSIA https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-political-elite-of-the-
eu-is-following-the-orders-from-the-us-when-imposing-sanctions-on-russia-while-european-
businessmen-are-breaking-these-rules-and-work-with-russia/ Issue 123 
162. 10.10.2018: DISINFO: EUROPE IS DYING: DECAY OF MORAL AND FAMILY VALUES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-dying-decay-of-moral-and-family-values/ Issue 122 
163. 1.10.2018: DISINFO: MOST EUROPEANS HAVE A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/most-europeans-have-a-negative-attitude-towards-the-eu/ Issue 
121 
164. 21.7.2018: DISINFO: JUNCKER WARNS: EUROPE WILL BECOME TOO SMALL AND IT WILL NOT BE 
IMPORTANT https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/juncker-warns-europe-will-become-small-and-it-will-
not-be-important/ Issue 116 
165. 28.5.2018: DISINFO: EUROPE RECOGNIZED THE LOSS OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-recognized-the-loss-of-its-sovereignty/ Issue 110 
166. 2.5.2018: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION WANTS TO CERTIFY “TRUE” INFORMATION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-commission-wants-to-certify-true-information/ 
Issue 107 
167. 16.3.2018: DISINFO: A GAY DICTATORSHIP HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-gay-dictatorship-has-been-established-in-the-eu/ Issue 103 
168. 22.2.2018: DISINFO: EU AND NATO’S WAR AGENDA EXPOSED https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-
and-natos-war-agenda-exposed/ Issue 100 
169. 20.11.2017: DISINFO: PESCO INDICATES EUROPE’S LACK OF INDEPENDENCE FROM THE US 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/pesco-indicates-europes-lack-of-independence-from-the-us/ Issue 
88 
170. 11.10.2017: DISINFO: THE EU’S RULING ELITE INTEND TO TAKE THE BLOC DOWN 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/flanders-can-separate-from-belgium/ Issue 84 
171. 2.10.2017: DISINFO: EU IS PRESENTING ITSELF AS A POLITICAL AND ALMOST A MILITARY ENEMY 
OF RUSSIA https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/today-the-eu-is-presenting-itself-as-a-political-and-
military-enemy-of-russia-so-the-more-crisis-the-more-conflicts-and-the-more-evil-will-be-in-
europe-the-better-russia-will-be/ Issue 83 
172. 19.8.2017: DISINFO: EU ENSURES MILITARY INFLUENCE THROUGH ITS PROGRAMS, AND THIS IS 
WHY NATO WAS FOUNDED IN 1949 https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/through-its-programs-eu-
ensures-military-influence-that-is-why-the-nato-was-founded-in-1949/ Issue 80 
75 
 
173. 6.7.2017: DISINFO: THE EU THREATENS WITH VIOLENCE TOWARDS THE MEMBER STATES THAT… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-threatens-with-violence-towards-the-member-states-that/ 
Issue 76 
174. 14.3.2017: DISINFO: THE EU IS NOT ACCOUNTABLE TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS NOR TO… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-not-accountable-to-national-governments-nor-to/ Issue 
63 
175. 16.2.2017: DISINFO: EU’S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PROGRAMMES IN RUSSIA AIM AT AN “INTERNAL… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eus-public-diplomacy-programmes-in-russia-aim-at-an-internal/ 
Issue 59 
176. 7.2.2017: DISINFO: THE EU IS A TOOL OF GLOBALISATION AND TOTALITARIANISM 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-a-tool-of-globalisation-and-totalitarianism-2/ Issue 58 
177. 16.1.2017: DISINFO: THE BRUSSELS BUREAUCRACY HAS NOT BEEN ELECTED BY ANYONE 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-brussels-bureaucracy-has-not-been-elected-by-anyone/ Issue 
56 
178. 2.12.2016: DISINFO: A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF PEOPLE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WANTS 
REFERENDUM ON LEAVING THE EU https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/a-significant-share-of-people-
in-european-countries-support-the/ Issue 50 
179. 25.11.2016: DISINFO: THE EU AND THE CZECH GOVERNMENT ARE PUPPETS OF THE USA 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-and-the-czech-government-are-puppets-of-the/ Issue 50 
180. 25.11.2016: DISINFO: EU IS A BIGGER THREAT TO EUROPEANS THAN “RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA” 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/russian-propaganda-is-just-like-european-propaganda/ Issue 50 
181. 23.11.2016: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT EQUATES THE RUSSIAN MEDIA WITH THE 
PROPAGANDA OF DAESH https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-parliaments-resolution-on-
anti-eu-propaganda-from-russia-and/ Issue 49 
182. 23.11.2016: DISINFO: THE EU HAS ALWAYS BEEN UNDER THE TOTAL CONTROL OF… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-has-always-been-under-the-total-control-of/ Issue 49 
183. 23.11.2016: DISINFO: THE MEPS’ RESOLUTION ON ANTI-EU PROPAGANDA DEMONSTRATES EU’S 
DE-CHRISTIANISATION https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-meps-resolution-on-anti-eu-
propaganda-from-russia-and-islamist/ Issue 49 
184. 21.11.2016: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IS PREPARING TO ADOPT A RESOLUTION, 
TARGETING ORTHODOX “PROPAGANDA” https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-
parliament-is-preparing-to-adopt-a-resolution-on/ Issue 50 
185. 9.11.2016: DISINFO: THE EU HAS BECOME THE VASSAL OF THE US 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-has-become-the-vassal-of-the-us/ Issue 47 
186. 25.10.2016: DISINFO: THE EU DESTROYS NATIONAL IDENTITY OF ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES AND… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-destroys-national-identity-of-its-member-countries-and/ 
Issue 46 
187. 9.9.2016: DISINFO: EUROPE IS A VASSAL OF THE US; THE EU IS… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-a-vassal-of-the-us-the-eu-is/ Issue 39 
188. 12.7.2016: DISINFO: THE EU IS A TOOL OF THE USA AGAINST RUSSIA 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-a-tool-of-the-usa-against-russia/  
189. 12.7.2016: DISINFO: AFTER THE REFERENDUM IN THE UK, THE EU WILL FALL… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/after-the-referendum-in-the-uk-the-eu-will-fall/ Issue 35 
76 
 
190. 10.7.2016: DISINFO: BREXIT MEANS THAT THE EU WAS EXCLUDED FROM FINANCIAL WORLD… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/brexit-means-that-the-eu-was-excluded-from-financial-world/ 
Issue 35 
191. 8.7.2016: DISINFO: MAINSTREAM MEDIA SPREAD PROPAGANDA IN FAVOUR OF THE USA AND… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/mainstream-media-spread-propaganda-in-favour-of-the-usa-and/ 
Issue 35 
192. 2.7.2016: DISINFO: THE EU IS MERELY A VASSAL OF THE US POLITICAL… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-merely-a-vassal-of-the-us-political/ Issue 34 
193. 1.7.2016: DISINFO: THE EU IS WORSE THAN USSR. THE EVIDENCE IS THAT… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-worse-than-ussr-the-evidence-is-that/ Issue 34 
194. 30.6.2016: DISINFO: NO ONE ELECTED EUROPEAN COUNCIL, NOR EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/no-one-elected-european-council-nor-european-commission/ 
Issue 33 
195. 29.6.2016: DISINFO: BRITISH CITIZENS VOTED FOR LEAVE THE EU, THEREBY THEY RESISTED… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/british-citizens-voted-for-leave-the-eu-thereby-they-resisted/ Issue 
33 
196. 26.6.2016: DISINFO: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EU IS A FACT https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-
dissolution-of-the-eu-is-a-fact/ Issue 33 
197. 25.6.2016: DISINFO: AS A CONSEQUENCE OF BREXIT, THE WHOLE EASTERN EUROPE WILL… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/as-a-consequence-of-brexit-the-whole-eastern-europe-will/ Issue 
34 
198. 24.6.2016: DISINFO: BREXIT SHOWS THAT 500 MILLION EUROPEANS SAID NO TO THE UNITED 
STATES OF EUROPE https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/brexit-indicates-that-500-million-european-
citizens-said-no-to/ Issue 33 
199. 2.6.2016: DISINFO: THE EU IS A STUPID AND EVIL PARODY OF THE… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-is-a-stupid-and-evil-parody-of-the/ Issue 29 
200. 8.5.2016: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN UNION IS A TOTALITARIAN REGIME 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-is-a-totalitarian-regime-where-complete-
loyalty/ Issue 27 
201. 21.4.2016: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN UNION IS CONTROLLED BY THE US 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-is-controlled-by-the-us-because-of/ Issue 25 
202. 10.4.2016: DISINFO: EUROPE DIED IN 2004 AFTER THE NEW MEMBER STATES JOINED… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-died-in-2004-after-the-new-member-states-joined/ Issue 
23 
203. 15.3.2016: DISINFO: EUROPE IS UNDER US OCCUPATION https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-
is-under-us-occupation/ Issue 20 
204. 29.2.2016: DISINFO: ANGELA MERKEL’S AUTOCRACY CAUSES THE DISSOLUTION OF THE EU 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/angela-merkels-autocracy-causes-the-dissolution-of-the-eu/ Issue 
18 
205. 28.2.2016: DISINFO: THE EU WILL SOON COLLAPSE UNDER THE WEIGHT OF PROBLEMS… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-eu-will-soon-collapse-under-the-weight-of-problems/ Issue 18 
206. 27.2.2016: DISINFO: EU IS A TOTALITARIAN REGIME THAT REFUSES ANY LEVEL OF… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-is-a-totalitarian-regime-that-refuses-any-level-of/ Issue 18 
77 
 
207. 6.1.2016: DISINFO: EUROPE IS BECOMING LESS AND LESS EUROPEAN 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/europe-is-becoming-less-and-less-european/ Issue 10 
208. 3.1.2016: DISINFO: EU LEADERS ARE TRYING TO ERADICATE CHRISTIANITY 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/eu-leaders-are-trying-to-eradicate-christianity/ Issue 10 
209. 1.12.2015: DISINFO: USA, EU AND CANADA ARE IMPERIALISTIC REGIMES 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/usa-eu-and-canada-are-imperialistic-regimes/ Issue 6 
210. 3.6.2015: DISINFO: THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS DECLARED WAR ON INTERNET FREE SPEECH:… 
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/report/the-european-union-has-declared-war-on-internet-free-speech/ 
Issue 30 
